

MAY, 1983

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In this issue, readers will find challenging differences of opinion. Perhaps because of the emotional nature of the difficulties involved in arms control, it has been impossible to find a consensus on Soviet or American defense expenditures, total missile stockpiles, or strategic and theater weapons totals. Nor is there agreement on the implications of SALT I and II, the significance of the freeze movement, the validity of worst-case scenarios, or the charge that the Soviet Union and its allies engage in chemical warfare in violation of treaty obligations.

Specialists on arms control and weapons development are often the prisoners of their own preconceptions and engage in what Carl Jacobsen has termed "the dialogue of the deaf." This issue offers a diversity of views on the arms race, the possibilities of arms control, and the strategies of the superpowers.

In our next issue, September, 1983, on **China**, the following topics will be featured;

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Current History

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"Americans have never felt comfortable with official discussions of nuclear weapons and their potential use in wartime. While they recognize the unpleasant realities of the nuclear age, they would rather not be reminded of the possibility of nuclear annihilation. The less said the better, especially by key decision-makers."

The Reagan Administration's Nuclear Strategy

BY EDWARD C. LUCK

Executive Vice President, United Nations Association

THE administration of Ronald Reagan, partly by design but mostly by inadvertence, has sparked the widest public debate about United States nuclear strategy since the onset of the nuclear age 37 years ago. Once the exclusive preserve of officials, military officers and think-tank strategists, nuclear policy has itself become the target for public debate and mass demonstrations. With more sincerity than expertise, Americans—and West Europeans—are challenging the traditional assumptions underlying nuclear strategy and are searching for more palatable alternatives.

Public attention, it is true, has focused from time to time on related issues, like civil defense in the late 1950's, the purported bomber and missile gaps of the late 1950's and early 1960's, proposed ABM (anti-ballistic missile) deployments in the late 1960's, and the negotiation and ratification of the SALT (strategic arms limitation treaty) agreements in the 1970's. All these debates influenced important aspects of nuclear policy, but they fell short of questioning the fundamental rationales for the development, procurement and possible use of nuclear weapons. Today, many Americans are expressing doubts about the very legitimacy of nuclear weapons as a deterrent or as a means of defense if deterrence fails.

By viewing the central themes of the Reagan administration and its critics from the perspective of larger historical and international trends, it may be possible to clarify the terms of the debate rather than to add yet another voice to it. Specifically:

Why has the American public been so sensitive to nuclear issues since the inauguration of President Reagan?

What has this administration done or said to spark such controversy?

What have been the basic lines of administration policies and strategies concerning nuclear weapons?

How have these differed from the policies of its predecessors? Do they represent just another step in a process of incremental evolution or a more radical departure from traditional thinking?

How have related factors in the larger political-military environment—such as East-West relations, arms control negotiations, alliance politics, and domestic politics—influenced recent developments in United States strategies and public perceptions?

How has the administration's approach evolved over the past two years, and what might the future hold?

First, the domestic political circumstances surrounding the advent of the Reagan presidency were prone to producing controversy about nuclear issues. During the campaign, candidate Reagan's past reputation for tough and sometimes loose talk about the importance of military strength in dealing with international crises came back to haunt him. After working hard to moderate his image, the President-elect appointed transition teams on defense and foreign policy issues that included many individuals with strong and controversial views about 1) the utility of nuclear weapons for war-fighting as well as for deterrence and 2) the advantages of a margin of nuclear superiority. His choice for Secretary of State, Alexander M. Haig Jr., was a military man known for candor and assertiveness, while the new Secretary of Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, had almost no experience in these matters. It was therefore not surprising that journalists and other close political observers were from the outset sensitive to any signs that the new administration might take a new and potentially dangerous tack on nuclear weapons policy.

The administration would have had to have been

extraordinarily cautious and circumspect regarding nuclear issues—which it proved not to be—to have headed off the growing storm of controversy. As with most new administrations, this one was eager to show a sharp break with the past, to prove that it had innovative ideas, and to put other countries on notice that a strong and determined team had taken charge in Washington. These traditional tendencies were magnified by the bitter campaign, the change in parties, and the feeling among conservative Republicans that they and their ideas had been ignored for far too long by the Washington establishment. The administration's initial perceptions were further colored by a deep feeling that American global influence was on the decline because the administration of Jimmy Carter had allowed United States military power to deteriorate at a time of increasing Soviet assertiveness, backed by growing Soviet military strength.

Second, Americans have never felt comfortable with official discussions of nuclear weapons and their potential use in wartime. While they recognize the unpleasant realities of the nuclear age, they would rather not be reminded of the possibility of nuclear annihilation. The less said the better, especially by key decision-makers. No true democracy would choose to exterminate itself or any other country under any plausible circumstances. There is something inherently undemocratic about the concept of a large-scale nuclear exchange. To most Americans, the possession of large numbers of nuclear weapons is acceptable and legitimate primarily as a deterrent to the use of nuclear weapons by other countries. The concepts of selective, limited nuclear strikes and of first use to prevent Warsaw Pact conventional forces from overrunning West Europe have long been discussed in official and academic circles, but are not widely known or generally endorsed by the American public.

Any statements by high-level United States officials about the conduct of nuclear war are likely to scare people and to remind them of their stark vulnerability to nuclear attack. Unlike Europeans, Asians, or Africans, Americans have largely been sheltered from the ravages of major wars. As the United States homeland became increasingly vulnerable to attack by intercontinental nuclear weapons, Americans readily accepted the conclusion that there could be no defense against nuclear attack.¹ The concept of partial defense, resulting in high casualties (tens of millions) but less than total destruction, has never been acceptable to most Americans, as demonstrated in the popular rejection of ABM systems or civil defense measures that would

not be close to 100 percent effective. The only sensible alternative, in the public's view, was to focus official attention and resources on deterrence, not defense.

Third, the nuclear issue became intertwined with the politics of budget-cutting at the height of a major recession. The Reagan administration sought and (in fiscal 1982 and fiscal 1983) received from Congress substantial increases in military outlays while cutting back on domestic social programs. This shift in priorities led to the reversal of the long-term trend in which defense spending had been decreasing as a portion of the federal budget and of the gross national product (GNP). In fiscal 1982, the defense budget topped 25 percent of federal spending for the first time since 1975 and equaled 6 percent of the GNP for the first time since 1972. Both figures rose in fiscal 1983.

An increase in defense expenditures, of course, does not necessarily mean an increase in the likelihood of war; and in this case it was intended to have the opposite effect by bolstering the United States ability to deter aggression. Yet pleas to the public to make sacrifices for the sake of pressing military needs were bound to increase fears that war was imminent. In retrospect, the dilemma seems obvious: unless the situation was painted in dire terms, the public and Congress would not have responded to the proposed shift in budget priorities; yet once the public accepted the premise of maximum threat or perceived that the President believed it, then fears of war and the use of nuclear weapons were stimulated. By seeking across-the-board defense increases in a period of austerity, the Reagan administration raised broad political opposition both to its basic defense program and to its ideas on nuclear strategy.

REAGAN ADMINISTRATION POLICIES

United States nuclear policies can be addressed on three basic levels: 1) weapons procurement, research and development on new systems and command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I); 2) doctrines and plans concerning the use and targeting of nuclear weapons in wartime and measures to protect United States military and civilian targets; and 3) principles, concepts, and intentions enunciated in public statements, either written or oral. The first level defines—once the capabilities and plans of opposing forces and other external factors are taken into account—the military tasks that American forces *can* conceivably accomplish. The second level expresses the military objectives and missions that United States officials would *like* the nuclear forces to achieve. And the third level provides the means of explaining to the public and other countries what United States plans and purposes are and signaling changes in those plans. The debates regarding Reagan administration policies have had a tendency to slide from level to level, fostering confusion rather than clarity.

¹For a review of the early postwar American writings on the subject of nuclear war and the infeasibility of defense, see Edward C. Luck, "Deterrence Theory and Nuclear War Endings," in *On the Endings of Wars*, ed. by Stuart Albert and Edward C. Luck (London: Kennikat Press, National University Publications, 1980).

In theory, public statements (level three) are designed to gain political support for the weapons programs in level one in order to fulfill the objectives of level two. Yet if the public posturing (level three) is handled ineptly, as it has been too frequently in the Reagan administration, then the forces attained in level one will be insufficient to carry out the level two tasks, potentially leading to a serious disjuncture between stated policy and performance.

The most glaring example has been the administration's stress on the existence of a "window of vulnerability" caused by the growing Soviet threat to the United States fixed-site Minuteman ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) force, one leg of the United States strategic deterrent triad. While the problem has long been recognized by strategic analysts, the administration may have lost credibility by putting so much public emphasis on a problem for which it did not have a workable and politically salable solution.

The administration inherited from its predecessors the MX (missile experimental) program, a new and larger ICBM that would address several perceived weaknesses in the United States strategic force posture but that would do little to ease the vulnerability problem without some sort of mobile basing mode. It is instructive to recall that Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, in his report to Congress seven years ago, noted that, "By far the most difficult problem which must be resolved in this new [MX] ICBM program is the selection of a basing mode."² The Carter administration proposed a basing system of multiple protective shelters (MPS), which would probably have been less vulnerable, but which raised a host of financial, political, environmental, technical and arms control questions. During the presidential campaign, candidate Reagan rejected the MPS approach, but despite much study, his administration has yet to put forward a well-thought-out alternative. As of this writing, the President's Strategic Forces Panel, under the competent leadership of Brent Scowcroft, is struggling to find a way out of the dilemma. In the meantime, less and less is being heard about the "window of vulnerability."

Other ambiguous—and to many observers—troubling phrases were introduced and then quietly withdrawn by the administration. In his *FY 1983 Report to the Congress*, Secretary of Defense Weinberger declared

²Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and FY 1977* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 5, 1975), p. II-27.

³Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress, FY 1983* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 8, 1982), p. I-17 (emphasis added).

⁴Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress, FY 1984* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1, 1983), pp. 32 and 35 (emphasis in original).

that the modernization of United States strategic nuclear forces was "not designed to achieve nuclear 'superiority' for the United States, by the same token, we will make every necessary effort to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring such superiority and to insure the *margin of safety* necessary for our security."³ To the average ear, that sounded like an intention to attain a degree of nuclear superiority, which would inevitably lead to arms race instability. The Soviet Union, after all, had made great efforts to overcome the early United States lead in nuclear weapons and appeared determined to maintain at least a parity relationship. The administration, finding the phrase "margin of safety" hard to define and controversial, soon dropped it from its strategic vocabulary.

The administration's stated intention to "prevail" in a nuclear war was hard to differentiate from the concept of "winning" such a costly contest. If officials thought that a war could be won, then, in extremis, they might be more tempted to engage in such a war than if they thought it would result in near-total destruction for both sides. That phraseology has also faded from administration pronouncements. In his *FY 1984 Annual Report to the Congress*, released February 1, 1983, Secretary Weinberger adopted a more carefully defined and apparently more moderate approach. The stress now is on the "defensive" and "deterrent" nature of United States strategy. However, if deterrence should fail, "our strategy is to *restore peace on favorable terms*," by seeking "to limit the scope, duration, and intensity of conflict."⁴

Thus from the outset, the administration has been plagued as much by its words—levels two and three of nuclear policies—as by its actions in terms of weapons development and procurement. Its words have been important, particularly as signals to its allies and potential adversaries, and have suggested some evolution in thinking about nuclear war compared to the views of its predecessors. The basic issue today, as it has been for the last two decades, is whether the United States should plan its forces and strategies solely to deter nuclear war or whether, in addition, it should prepare to fight an extended conflict if deterrence fails, and should attempt to minimize damage to American society, values and forces.

On one side of the long-standing debate are those who fear that preparations to fight a war could undermine deterrence and actually make a nuclear war more likely. In their view, if both sides have structured and poised their forces to conduct a nuclear war, then crisis stability would be endangered as both sides seek the traditional military advantages of surprise and preemption when war appears imminent. Again and again, history has shown major powers exaggerating the capabilities of their military forces to gain victory, overestimating the prospects for limiting the scope and duration of a conflict once it has begun, and under-

estimating the destruction that would result from a war with their chief rivals.

Nuclear conflict, it is widely believed, would be even harder to limit, because of the rapidity with which it would unfold; the inevitably high levels of civilian casualties even in "selective" strikes against military targets; the lack of experience and precedents in conducting nuclear war; the disruption of communication systems; and the likely elimination of much of the top national leadership on both sides early in the conflict.

Deterrence theory, first articulated in the immediate postwar years when nuclear weapons were few, cumbersome and inaccurate, was based on the assumption that the chief targets in a nuclear war would be major cities. The resulting mutual hostage relationship, it was believed, would deter war until a reliable structure of international institutions and treaties could be established to ensure the peace. This relationship, later described as mutual assured destruction (MAD), was the best that could be hoped for, because there was no reliable defense and no means of rendering the opposing nuclear forces incapable of retaliation.

While deterrence remains the core of United States and evidently Soviet nuclear doctrine, technological and procurement trends in the 1960's and increasingly in the 1970's made it more feasible and attractive to plan to attack military as well as civilian targets. The key factors were a vast increase in the number of warheads on both sides; great accuracy improvements; the development and deployment of MIRV's (multiple, independently-targeted reentry vehicles); and, on the Soviet side, the deployment of large ICBM's. Beginning with Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's 1962 proposal for a "no cities" principle, by which both sides would concentrate their attacks on military forces rather than on population centers,⁵ United States strategic doctrine has increasingly emphasized the secondary goal of damage limitation should deterrence fail. If deterrence fails, Secretary of Defense Weinberger notes, "the dividends of a viable war-fighting defense are unquestionable."⁶

In 1961, the first United States Single Integrated

⁵Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara at Ann Arbor, Michigan, on June 16, 1962, quoted in William W. Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 116.

⁶Weinberger, *Report to the Congress, FY 1984*, p. 34.

⁷For a well-informed survey of the evolution of United States targeting doctrine, see Thomas Powers, "Choosing a Strategy for World War III," *The Atlantic*, vol. 250, no. 5 (November, 1982), pp. 82-110.

⁸Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, speech to the Overseas Writers Association, Washington, D.C., January 10, 1974.

⁹See Richard Burt, "Carter Reported to Approve a Plan for Limiting Any Nuclear Warfare," *The New York Times*, August 6, 1980, p. 1, and a speech by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown at the Naval War College on August 20, 1980.

¹⁰Weinberger, *Report to the Congress, FY 1984*, p. 55.

Operations Plan (SIOP)—a euphemism for the targeting plan that would guide the use of United States nuclear weapons in wartime—called for attacks on military (counterforce) as well as on civilian (counter-value) targets.⁷ Secretary of Defense Schlesinger went further in 1974 when he called for "selective strikes" and for a range of options to strike military facilities as well as cities.⁸ Ironically, it was President Jimmy Carter's Presidential Directive 59 (PD59) of July 25, 1980, that gave presidential approval to the increasing emphasis on counterforce targeting and preparations for fighting a nuclear war if deterrence failed (although President Carter was later blamed by the Reagan team for letting United States defenses slip).⁹

The Reagan administration's verbal emphasis on nuclear war-fighting options is clearly more a continuation of a trend than a radical departure. At the same time, the administration's criticisms of traditional theories of mutual assured destruction have been unusually harsh. Secretary of Defense Weinberger's *FY 1984 Report to the Congress* presents the following detailed critique:

Some believe that we must threaten explicitly, even solely, the mass destruction of civilians on the adversary side, thus inviting a corresponding destruction of civilian populations on our side, and that such a posture will achieve stability in deterrence. This is incorrect. Such a threat is neither moral nor prudent. The Reagan administration's policy is that under no circumstances may such weapons be used deliberately for the purpose of destroying populations.

For this reason, we disagree with those who hold that deterrence should be based on nuclear weapons designed to destroy cities rather than military targets. Deliberately designing weapons aimed at populations is neither necessary nor sufficient for deterrence. If we are forced to retaliate and can only respond by destroying population centers, we invite the destruction of our own population. Such a deterrent strategy is hardly likely to carry conviction as a deterrent, particularly as a deterrent to nuclear—let alone conventional—attack on an ally.¹⁰

This passage was followed by a criticism of those who favor the "no first use" doctrine. The administration may also have been trying to counter arguments for a much less expensive—and some would say less provocative—posture of minimum deterrence. In any case, it is clear that, as long as both sides are armed with many thousands of highly accurate warheads, they will continue to aim at a wide range of civilian and military targets.

As regards the first level of policy, the administra-

(Continued on page 232)

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"... Any venture abroad that would risk the existence of the Soviet state, whose defense remains the first and overriding concern of the Soviet military, would probably be branded an unmerited adventure by those in charge of the Ministry of Defense."

Russian Tradition and Soviet Military Policy

BY DAVID R. JONES

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UNTIL recently, most Western studies of the Russian past's impact on the armed forces and defense policies of the Soviet Union have drawn on abstract generalities. Thus Communist "dictatorship" is seen as Czarist autocracy in a new garb; an alleged Soviet "militarization" of society is a recurrence of imperial Russian "militarism"; and Soviet "expansionism" is a new form of "Great Russian Imperialism." Such writings often assert that the Russians have a historically conditioned taste for authoritarianism or a lust for "warm water ports," but they have little to say about the specific issues of Soviet military policy or the place of the armed forces in Soviet society.

On the other hand, students who deal with the Soviet military today frequently concentrate on party-military relations. And with a few notable exceptions, this group of Western scholars handle the subject in a historical vacuum, as if imperial habits and traditions had no relevance for today's military establishment. Thus, if the analyses of the first group suffer from the historicism of their approach, those of the second group often suggest a complete ignorance of Russian history before 1917.

Yet even a brief glance at the military systems of Czarist and Soviet Russia reveals that organizationally and socially, they share more traits than either does with its "capitalist" counterparts. A long list of institutions and customs bears witness to this fact, in spite of the egalitarianism allegedly introduced by the revolution of 1917. Today such characteristics include dress uniforms, personal military ranks for officers (restored in the 1930's), and the reappearance of the once hated shoulder boards, gold braid and medals. As one Russian friend, whose family had emigrated during the Civil War, remarked after a visit to the Soviet Union in the late 1950's: "It was marvellous. Nothing had changed. There were uniforms and medals everywhere!"

At a more serious level, this list includes the restoration of the title "Guards" for elite regiments, the lauding of imperial Russian military and naval exploits, and the renewed use of old (if sometimes updated) proverbs in the training of conscripts. As for the of-

ficers—the use of which term itself came back during World War II—they once again frequently come from professional military families, have often been educated initially in Suvorov Schools (read cadet corps), for the most part live out their lives as members of regimental "families," and often choose as brides the daughters or the sisters of their colleagues. All these features once caused Russia's Marxist revolutionaries to castigate (incorrectly) the Czar's *ofitserstvo* as a reactionary caste. Indeed, even the once condemned institution of the "court of honor," in which officers judge each other in cases of minor offenses, has been restored. Today this "caste institution" receives extensive treatment in any work on Soviet military legislation. All in all, the list of such reinstated customs and practices is so long that it would need little more than the reintroduction of the duel to make it complete.

From the purely institutional point of view, the similarities are equally striking. Here the Ministry of Defense, which presides over a network of military districts, is instructive, because this structure first appeared as a result of the reorganization carried through by D. A. Miliutin in the 1860's. True, the army and navy are now combined within the same ministry, which was not the case before 1917. Even so, many of the central administration's procedures and the forms taken by its constituent and subordinate bodies seem consciously or unconsciously to evoke the Russian past. Most impressive of all, the decision-making system for defense as a whole, with its Defense Council, General Staff, Military-Industrial Commission, and wartime General Headquarters (Stavka), has a striking resemblance to the system assembled by Czar Nicholas II during 1915-1917 (Stavka, War Ministry, Special Conferences for Defense, and so on). In addition, references to "Marshal Leonid Brezhnev" as a *vozhd* after the 25th party congress are especially interesting. Often found in folk tales and ballads, this term refers to "leaders" who combine military brilliance with political wisdom in a manner justifying the use of adjectives such as "legendary," "invincible" and "immortal." Apart from Stalin, many Russian rulers from Riurik to Nicholas II have sought this dignity; presumably it is a title that they believe strikes a deep

chord among their subjects. With the other continuities mentioned, its use in relation to Brezhnev certainly reflects the impact of the Russian past on the Soviet present. It also suggests that there may well be a style that is especially appropriate for use by those ruling this sprawling Eurasian empire. At the very least, the term's reappearance supports the contention of some historians that Russia is basically a conservative nation—perhaps the most conservative in Europe.

The above discussion prompts one other conclusion. If Brezhnev felt the need to bolster his image as a military figure, this means that the military profession has probably been held in fairly high regard in Russia. To be sure, the majority of Russians have never enthusiastically embraced military service, a fact that is reflected in the recurrent shortages of officers and long-service cadre/noncommissioned officers in both the Czarist and Soviet armies. But apart from the bleak years around 1917, the Russians have accorded their military professionals a continued level of respect that many Western soldiers might envy. In return, the officers have often played a prominent and positive part in their country's cultural life. This is clear if one recalls the contributions of figures like Lermontov, Tolstoy, Kuprin, and Moussorgsky, among others, to Russian literature and music.

Again, the military system has traditionally had a strong interest in education. Thus the War Ministry's schools were the best in the country in the 1870's. From that time on young officers not infrequently saw themselves as serving in a "national university," which united the empire by teaching patriotism and which served its populace by giving peasant conscripts the rudiments of literacy. As for the latter, although they may have regarded military service as an evil, they usually accepted it as an unavoidable and necessary one.

In large part, this attitude is natural, given Russia's geographical position, which has always made the maintenance of strong armed forces a first priority of the state. Unlike Great Britain and the United States, the Russian heartland has no protection from the sea or other natural barriers. If this has facilitated expansion, it has also led to repeated aggression against Russia. For example, one Imperial historian estimated that between 1055 and 1462 the Kievan and Muscovite states suffered 245 attacks. The tempo reached its peak between 1240 and 1462, when enemy incursions took place at a rate of over one a year. Again, between the years 1365 and 1893, Russia was at war for over 305 years, and the state nearly disappeared during the Time of Troubles of 1603–1613. Since 1893, the record has hardly been more inspiring.

Equally important, like their Soviet descendants today, Russian military planners almost always have had to worry simultaneously about defending their European frontiers, keeping order along their long south-

ern borders, and maintaining their position in the east. So while the issue of Russian-Soviet imperialism deserves attention, in many cases expansion may also have originated from the not unnatural desire for secure frontiers. Similarly, the average Russian's acceptance of the need for military power, combined with at least a grudging respect for those embodying it, is normal when considered against this backdrop.

The real threats and paranoia about encirclement—be it "capitalist" or otherwise—imposed by geography explain one other, somewhat more surprising aspect of continuity. In a day when many are expressing concern about the Soviet defense budget, little attention has been devoted to the question of what a normal Russian rate of spending might be. In part, this situation doubtless reflects the difficulties of establishing gross national product figures for earlier periods. However a standard for measuring the state's interest in defense is available from an analysis of the proportion of the annual general budgets allocated to "defense and defense-related expenditures." According to a United States Central Intelligence Agency study, in 1970 this probably amounted to some 28 to 32 percent while according to graphs presented on television by United States President Ronald Reagan in the autumn of 1982, the proportion of United States expenditures for defense and defense-related expenditures has not dropped below roughly 26 percent since 1960. Of more interest is the fact that since industrializing in the 1860's–1870's, the imperial Russian government usually spent between 25 and 30 percent (a drop from an average of 37 to 47 percent before industrialization) of its budget on defense. The average figure for the years 1862 to 1875, for example, is roughly 30 percent.

It appears therefore that in normal peacetime conditions, investment at about this rate is a reflection of the state's normal and constant concerns for security, and that the figures for the mid-1970's may not be as unusual as some fear. More disturbing is the fact that, in spite of a backward economy, the Imperial government was able to raise this rate significantly when this seemed necessary. Thus when new shipbuilding programs were launched in 1910, one Soviet historian has estimated that defense accounted for a whopping 43 percent of all state expenditures. This was, of course, an exceptional case. Nonetheless it suggests strongly that the state's security is one area for which Russian rulers have long been willing to sacrifice other interests.

As might be expected, the continuities outlined in the sphere of geographical concern, social habits and defense expenditures are paralleled by military thought and doctrine. In itself this should cause little surprise. After all, of some 243 leading military writers identified as being active in 1929, 198 had served Nicholas II. Further, it was largely this group of "military

specialists" (*voenspetsy*) who translated the Marxist "military science" of Lenin, Trotsky and Frunze into practical precepts, which they then merged with the tactical and strategic concepts and lessons of the 1900–1917 era. In this sense, one can argue that the Red Army's search for a "unified military doctrine" only continued the similar efforts being made by Imperial soldiers on the eve of World War I. In addition, given the number of *voenspetsy* (some 50,000 in all) who served the young Soviet regime, it is not remarkable to find thinkers like former General A. Neznamov prominent in both eras.

Many continuities can be discerned in the spheres of strategy and tactics as well. For instance, the tactical formations employed by today's Soviet Army, in spite of the technological advances of the last 60 years, are strikingly similar to those adopted by the Czarist army before 1914. Beyond this, handbooks of both periods stress the need for using mass on the battlefield in a mobile and aggressive manner.

At higher operational or strategic levels, other resemblances are equally apparent. The massive, well-armed Soviet concentrations in East Europe are a case in point. With an offensive tactical doctrine, they are presumably ready to move at a moment's notice—a consideration that rouses great suspicion in the minds of many observers. But although these fears are not baseless, one should recall that such deployments have been typically Russian since the 1500's (at that time along Muscovy's long, vulnerable southern steppe frontier), largely because of the country's poor roads and the time needed to mobilize its forces. For these same reasons, large troop formations have been maintained almost continuously along Russia's western frontier since the mid-1700's. Further, in this region they are almost always deployed along the most likely invasion routes through eastern Germany and Poland, as is illustrated by the troops concentrated on Warsaw by Nicholas I. In fact, a similar style of deployment, along with a doctrine that stressed mass, maneuverability and the offensive, was employed by the Red Army in 1941. So before one assumes that today's concentrations must, ipso facto, be a sign of aggressive intentions, one should recall who invaded whom on June 22 of 1941.

Similar instances can be cited in other spheres, but one more will suffice here. Recently, many Western commentators have expressed alarm over the growing Soviet fleet, at its deployments in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, and at a seemingly new Soviet interest in African countries like Ethiopia. All this, some of them argue, is proof that the Soviet leadership has realized the utility of a powerful navy as a means of expanding its influence, and has built today's fleet for this purpose. Others insist that the Soviet naval pro-

gram arose rather from a desire to extend a defense perimeter into the world's oceans as a means of countering the American Polaris missile submarine in the early 1960's, and not because of any sudden realization of a fleet's utility as a means of waging *Realpolitik* around the globe. Although both views are still encountered among specialists, here again a search for historical continuity may help place the issues involved in context.

To begin with, this is not the first time that a Russian fleet, built originally for the central and more narrowly defensive ends of national security, has eventually been found serving "state interests" on a more global scale. Similar behavior followed the building programs of Catherine II and Paul I. Thus the Imperial Navy played a major if short-lived role in the Mediterranean during the 1770's, and again during the late 1790's and early 1800's. In 1806, it even had a shipyard at its main base on Corfu. And again, when the fleet was rebuilt during the 1860's–1880's, Russian squadrons once more appeared in the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, Ethiopia also became a target of considerable interest for St. Petersburg, and Russian warships sailed regularly through the Indian Ocean to the Far East.

Above and beyond geographical similarities, the striking point about these developments is that in each case the fleets were built for defense and were subsequently appreciated as a means of exerting influence in a more independent fashion elsewhere. More significant still, during the 1860's, naval men took to arguing in favor of the utility of naval power in doctrinal discussions that are closely echoed by Admiral S. G. Gorshkov's recent *Seapower of the State*.¹ In other words, apparently once the Russians possess a navy, they often succumb to the temptation of employing it politically for purposes other than originally intended; and their naval theorists tend to develop similar justifications for this behavior. But whatever the claims made by such theorists, to date the navy's ability to make sustained interventions that could bring Russia lasting political gains has remained limited at best.

Equally interesting, naval men have usually been more concerned with exercising power beyond Russia's frontiers than have their army counterparts. Considering the landlocked nature of the Russian state, this is natural. For while naval men will seek to avoid being caught like "fish in a bottle," the generals must remain occupied primarily with guarding the long land frontiers in order to preserve the integrity of the existing state. They have therefore been generally conservative with regard to "adventures" farther abroad, and for the most part they are willing to risk committing their own men only to ventures along Russia's own immediate borders. Even in these arenas, they usually seem to have been satisfied with maintaining a firm and stable frontier, even with an unfriendly state like the Shah's Iran. As a result, they appear to

¹S. G. Gorshkov, *Seapower of the State* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1978).

approve expansionary moves mainly when their opponent disintegrates or in the effort to extend a defensive buffer.

Such considerations clearly were major factors in Russia's expansion into Poland in the 1700's and 1939, into Central Asia in the 1860's-1880's, into Manchuria in 1896-1904, into Central Europe in 1940 and 1944-1945, and into Afghanistan in 1979. Yet as the Manchurian and Afghan cases illustrate, even in superficially favorable situations such an expansion or intervention can lead to a humiliating defeat or to a prolonged and exhausting guerrilla campaign—lessons not lost on today's planners.

The conclusion, then, is that Russia's military men generally have remained conservative about the use of force internally and externally, and that this remains true of the Ground Forces officers who predominate in today's Ministry of Defense. Internally, the Imperial *ofitserstvo* left its Soviet heirs the legacy of an army that buttressed the state's domestic peace, helped unify a multinational empire by acting as a transnational means of advancement and education for members of the subject peoples who served that empire, and served politically as an instrument loyal to the regime in power. This regime, be it the Czar's before 1917 or the Soviet government after the Polish invasion of 1920, has been the recognized focus of the military's own nationalist conceptions. Internally, this means that there is little likelihood that any party-military rivalry will lead the defense establishment to pose a real challenge to the Soviet government. As for the military's professional strategic doctrine, the army's view of itself as a political servant coincides with the high regard Russian officers long have had for the German thinker Karl von Clausewitz—a regard that has continued throughout the Soviet period thanks in part to Lenin's own appreciation for Clausewitz's classic study *On War*. For the most part, senior Russian and Soviet military men have accepted the truth of Clausewitz's dictum that "war is a continuation of politics by other [that is, violent] means," and accordingly have defined "strategy" and "doctrine" less narrowly than have many of their Western counterparts.

Apart from buttressing this Clausewitzian conception of armed conflict, Marxism-Leninism has given modern Soviet doctrine much of its political-strategic vocabulary. More significant still is its unique conception of the true nature of a "balance of forces," or as Soviet writers call it, the "correlation of forces." As matters have turned out, the application of the analytical tools employed in assessing this balance has probably guaranteed that Soviet military men remain at least as (and possibly more) conservative than their Czarist predecessors when it comes to using force for political interventions beyond their own recognized spheres of power. For apart from their constant worries about technological inferiority vis-à-vis their West-

ern neighbors and their central concern for the security of their extensive borders elsewhere, Soviet planners now are obliged to carry out a very complex analysis of the political and economic as well as the military factors involved in any decision. Further, since the range of factors to be considered contains many shifting elements that defy precise measurement, the planners involved in the analysis cannot normally ignore the fact that risks are involved. And even when these seem acceptable or necessary, as probably appeared to be the case with regard to Afghanistan in 1979, it is obvious that the results may not turn out as expected. For this reason, any venture abroad that would risk the existence of the Soviet state, whose defense remains the first and overriding concern of the Soviet military, would probably be branded an unmerited adventure by those in charge of the Ministry of Defense.

The issue of nuclear war well illustrates the interplay between the traditional conservatism and Marxist-Leninist theoretical assumptions that rule the minds of today's Soviet planners, be they soldiers or politicians. Here there is a basic problem. In the Marxist view, war must remain a theoretical possibility as long as the class antagonisms between the "socialist" and the "capitalist-imperialist" worlds remain unresolved. For this reason, and because as patriots they remember the horrors of surprise in 1941, the Soviet military planners intend to be ready to fight such a conflict if it comes. In addition, since they believe that their state represents progress and is historically predetermined to emerge victorious from any contest, they continually assert their belief that the Soviet Union must be prepared to fight and survive, in order to "win" any conventional or nuclear conflict.

But on the other hand, the Clausewitzian teaching that war serves politics simultaneously robs such assertions of much of their "rationality" when they are applied to a nuclear conflict. This arises from the Soviet recognition that the power of nuclear weapons is quantitatively so great that their use would change the nature of war qualitatively by making it a useless tool for pursuing political ends, which the conflagration in all probability would destroy or render meaningless. Beyond this, given the complexities of forecasting an everchanging correlation of forces during any conflict,

(Continued on page 230)

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"... President Reagan's historic boosting of United States arms expenditures from \$144 billion in 1981 to a projected \$343 billion in 1986 acted like a blood transfusion for the most doctrinaire and hawkish sector of the Soviet Union's party and military establishment."

East-West Relations at the Crossroads

BY CARL G. JACOBSEN

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THE year 1983 looks to be a make or break year for arms control. On the one hand, a number of military, technological and political factors have come together in a way that makes significant arms control and even arms reductions a real possibility for the first time in many years. On the other hand, if the opportunity is missed it is clear that we will be entering a cycle of the arms race that may stymie arms control aspirations for years and perhaps decades to come. The weapons technologies and weapons systems now ready to take off will result in less observable and less countable arsenals. Laser and high energy particle beam prospects and intercontinental-range cruise missiles small enough to hide in the trunk of an automobile promise to make the task of even the most reasonable arms negotiators of the 1990's well nigh impossible.¹

During the late 1970's, the spreading misperception that the military-political pendulum was swinging Moscow's way and that the Soviet Union might be on the verge of achieving meaningful superiority fueled the rightward trend in American politics that made Ronald Reagan President. President Reagan's historic boosting of United States arms expenditures from \$144 billion in 1981 to a projected \$343 billion in 1986 acted like a blood transfusion for the most doctrinaire and hawkish sector of the Soviet Union's party and military establishment. Fear that Washington was riding the crest of military-political momentum gave Soviet hardliners their chance. The weeks before Leonid Brezhnev's death witnessed their apparent victory. President Brezhnev himself and other leading Polit-

buro members confirmed a consensus decision to increase Soviet arms expenditures. They emphasized their reluctance, their recognition that the decision would mean deferment of at least some alternate investment goals. But they apparently concluded that they had no other option.

Their reluctance had of course been borne out by Soviet action, or lack thereof, during the preceding two years. Ronald Reagan's unremitting hostility in words and deeds was on the whole met by a surprisingly mild reaction in Moscow. In many ways Moscow clearly bent over backward to avoid adding fuel to White House fires. The conciliatory Soviet stance was epitomized by Moscow's announcement in February, 1983, that the principle of on-site inspection might be acceptable.* For political reasons Moscow had never before been willing to concede this long-standing American demand. The concession had little military relevance. After all, both SALT I and SALT II** had been predicated on the considered judgment of past American administrations, Republican as well as Democratic, that "national means of verification" (primarily satellites) had become so reliable that the scope for cheating was minimal and hence tolerable. Nevertheless, in political terms there was no question that the on-site concession and its symbolism were highly meaningful.

Moscow's conciliatory posture and its reluctance to up the arms race ante were a direct consequence of the squeeze occasioned by lower Soviet economic growth rates. Brezhnev had sidetracked Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin's 1964-1968 calls for extensive domestic economic reforms and decentralization by forging a consensus that more extensive computerization, supplemented by technology imports, would allow traditional central planning mechanisms to overcome the challenges of an ever more complex economy. For some years the prescription succeeded. Until about 1978 growth rates proved sufficient to satisfy aspirations for both guns and butter.

But the lower industrial growth rates that followed, compounded by largely weather-induced agricultural failures, dimmed the luster of Brezhnev's record, giv-

*See for example Soviet Ambassador Viktor Israelyan's speech of February 17, 1983, to the U.N. Committee on Disarmament; Soviet acceptance of the principle had been offered in the United States-Soviet Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations that began in 1977. Herbert F. York, the United States Ambassador to the talks after 1979, informed this author recently that "The Soviet negotiators early on had agreed to [on-site inspection] in principle, and we were more than halfway through the details when we adjourned. . . ."

**The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties.

¹C. G. Jacobsen, *The Nuclear Era: Its History; Its Implications* (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1982).

THE MILITARY BALANCE, 1982: A SUMMARY²**The Strategic Balance, U.S.—U.S.S.R. (see Table 1)**

Total warheads on bombers and missiles, official U.S. estimate:

U.S. somewhat over 9,000

U.S.S.R. somewhat over 7,000

Independently targetable warheads on missiles:

U.S. 7,032

U.S.S.R. 6,848

Theater nuclear balance in Europe

Theater nuclear missiles: Moscow now deploys 345; Britain and France, 162; the U.S., 0, but it is planning to begin deployment of 572 in late 1983. Moscow has offered to cut back to French and British levels of missiles and warheads, if the U.S. refrains from deployment (see Table 4).

Theater nuclear aircraft (land- and sea-based) stationed in Europe or transportable to Europe (see Table 5):

U.S.S.R. 1,380 primary long range

2,000 marginal long range

	TOTAL	3,380
Rest of Warsaw Pact		200

The Warsaw Pact TOTAL: 3,580

U.S. 2,190 primary long range
1,388 marginal long range

	TOTAL	2,578
Rest of NATO		1,877

NATO TOTAL: 4,445

Manpower balance (see Table 2)³

The Warsaw Pact 4,819,500

NATO 5,345,481

NOTE: French forces have been included. Paris' departure from de Gaulle's "tous azimuts" stance and the pattern of ever closer coordination with NATO military structure and strategy mean that France's pro forma exclusion from NATO military councils is today little more than a political figleaf. NATO can certainly rely more on French military resolve than Moscow can on Polish.

Technological balance

Western edge decreased, but still manifest—as exemplified in the fact that the Pershing 2 has six times the "kill probability against hardened targets" of the SS-20; Western tanks average twice the firing rate of Soviet tanks; Western submarines are quieter (hence less detectable); Western planes are more multi-capable; NATO "smart" and evolving "brilliant" technologies are unmatched, and so on.

Defense Spending (see Table 3)

U.S.S.R. (mean Western commercial banks' estimate)	\$ 94.60	billion
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Rest of Warsaw Pact	\$ 20.66	billion
Warsaw Pact TOTAL	\$115.26	billion

U.S.	\$215.9	billion
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Rest of NATO	\$106.144	billion
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NATO TOTAL: \$322.044 billion

it was the increasing credibility attached to the arguments of Kosygin's heirs that constituted the main obstacle to hardline ascendancy. The credibility of the reformers' arguments was doubly potent because it was accepted by significant elements within the military—by military leaders who recognized that longer-term security could best be effected through the social harmony that would attend a more vibrant economy. Still, Washington news steadily strengthened the hardline Soviet argument: reforms may be needed, but reforms take too long to implement; the challenge is now, and the response must be now.

In this context, the sweeping arms control proposals and extensive concessions to past Western demands made by the new Soviet General Secretary, Yuri Andropov, may well come to be seen as a last-ditch effort and a last chance. Andropov's ascendancy was regarded with some trepidation by those who remembered that he had been Soviet Ambassador in Hungary in 1956 and long-time director of the KGB. On the other hand, his Hungarian experience appears to have been coincidental. His posting to Budapest preceded the events that later culminated in uprising and repression. And his directorship of the KGB was that of a party man appointed to control the organization (the American analogy would not be William Casey, the present director of the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] for he had indeed been a "professional," but rather Vice President George Bush, who served as CIA director under President Gerald Ford).

There is no question of Andropov's intrinsic toughness. But it is both relevant and suggestive to note that his early career rise marked him as a protégé of Otto Kusinen, one of the least dogmatic of Soviet party figures. Equally instructive, his own current protégés include the best and the brightest of Kosygin's heirs. The timing of Brezhnev's death appears to have given them sanction for one final stab at détente-like relations with the other superpower. It is highly significant

²All figures presented are Western (except for the pro forma Soviet defense figure, presented for purposes of comparison); nearly all are extracted from official United States government documents. All have been culled from data reproduced in "World Armaments and Disarmament," *SIPRI Yearbook 1982* (Stockholm: International Peace Research Institute), and *The Military Balance 1982-83* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies). See also Jacobsen, *op. cit.*

³Restraints on Warsaw Pact manpower clearly weigh more heavily on Soviet prospects. Moscow deploys 47 divisions along the Sino-Soviet border (one-quarter have 50 percent or more of the required combat-ready complement; three-quarters are "category 3," with only 25 percent of combat-required personnel), facing Chinese forces with more than twice their numbers (but inferior equipment). More than one-fourth of Moscow's military budget goes to meet perceived Far Eastern defense requirements. One-third of Moscow's SS-20 force and one-third of the Backfire bombers (half to Naval Air) are deployed in the Far East.

ing it a pyrrhic quality. "Kosygin's heirs," those convinced then or since that Prime Minister Kosygin's analysis was essentially correct, gradually increased their following within the larger Central Committee, though not yet within the governing Politburo. Clearly,

TABLE 1: U.S. and Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1973–1982 (SIPRI Yearbook 1982)

		First in Service	Range (nm)	Payload	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Delivery vehicles														
<i>Strategic bombers</i>														
U.S.	B-52 C/D/E/F	1956	10 000	27 000 kg	149	116	99	83	83	83	83	83	83	83
	B-52 G/H	1959	10 900	34 000 kg	281	274	270	265	265	265	265	265	265	264
	(FB-111)	1970	3 300	17 000 kg	(66	66	66	66	66	66	66	65	64	63)
U.S.S.R.	Mya-4 'Bison'	1955	5 300	9 000 kg	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56
	Tu-95 'Bear'	1956	6 800	18 000 kg	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	(Tu-22M 'Backfire')	1975	4 000	9 000 kg	—	—	—	(12	24	36	48	60	72	84)
Long-range bomber total: U.S.					430	390	369	348	348	348	348	348	348	347
U.S.S.R.					156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156
<i>Submarines, ballistic missile-equipped, nuclear-powered (SSBN's)</i>														
U.S.	With Polaris A-2	1962	n.a.	16 × A-2	8	6	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	With Polaris A-3	1964	n.a.	16 × A-3	13	13	13	13	11	10	10	5	5	—
	With Poseidon C-3 conv.	1970	n.a.	16 × C-3	20	22	25	28	30	31	31	25	20	20
	With Trident C-4 conv.	1979	n.a.	16 × C-4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	11	11
	With Trident C-4	1980	n.a.	24 × C-4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
U.S.S.R.	'Hotel II' conv.	1963	n.a.	3 × 'SS-N-5'	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6
	'Hotel III' conv.	1967	n.a.	6 × 'SS-N-6'	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	'Yankee'	1968	n.a.	16 × 'SS-N-6'	33	33	33	33	33	33	33	29	27	23
	'Yankee II'	1974	n.a.	12 × 'SS-NX-17'	—	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	'Golf IV' conv.	1972	n.a.	4 × 'SS-N-8'	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	'Hotel IV' conv.	1972	n.a.	6 × 'SS-N-8'	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	'Delta I'	1973	n.a.	12 × 'SS-N-8'	1	7	12	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
	'Delta II'	1977	n.a.	16 × 'SS-N-8'	—	—	—	—	4	4	4	4	4	4
	'Delta III'	1978	n.a.	16 × 'SS-N-18'	—	—	—	—	—	2	4	10	12	16
Submarine total: U.S.					41	41	41	41	41	41	41	36	37	32
U.S.S.R.					44	51	56	62	66	68	70	71	71	71
Modern subs: U.S.S.R.					34	41	46	52	56	58	60	62	62	62
<i>SLBM (Submarine-launched ballistic missile) launchers on SSBN's</i>														
U.S.	Polaris A-2	1962	1 500	1 × 1 Mt	128	96	48	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Polaris A-3	1964	2 500	3 × 200 kt (MRV)	208	208	208	208	176	160	160	80	80	—
	Poseidon C-3	1970	2 500	10 × 40 kt (MIRV)	320	352	400	448	480	496	496	400	320	320
	Trident C-4	1979	4 000	8 × 100 kt (MIRV)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	96	200	200
U.S.S.R.	'SS-N-5'	1963	700	1 × 1 Mt	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	18	18	18
	'SS-N-6 mod. 1'	1968	1 300	1 × 1 Mt	534	534	534	534	534	534	534	470	438	374
	'SS-N-6 mod. 2' conv.	1973	1 600	1 × 1 Mt	—									
	'SS-N-6 mod. 3' conv.	1973	1 600	2 × 200 kt (MRV)	—									
	'SS-N-8'	1973	4 300	1 × 1 Mt	22	94	154	226	290	290	290	290	290	290
	'SS-NX-17'	n.a.	—	1 × 1 Mt (MIRV-cap.)	—	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
	'SS-N-18'	n.a.	4 050	3 × 200 kt (MIRV)	—	—	—	—	—	32	64	160	192	256
SLBM launcher total: U.S.					656	656	656	656	656	656	656	576	600	520
U.S.S.R.					577	661	721	793	857	889	921	950	950	950
<i>Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's)</i>														
U.S.	Titan II	1963	6 300	1 × 10 Mt	54	54	54	54	54	54	53	52	52	52
	Minuteman I	1963	6 500	1 × 1 Mt	190	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Minuteman II	1966	7 000	1 × 1.5 Mt	500	500	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450
	Minuteman III conv.	1970	7 000	3 × 170 kt (MIRV)	310	400	550	550	550	550	550	550	450	350
	Minuteman III impr.	1979	7 000	3 × 350 kt (MIRV)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	100	200
U.S.S.R.	'SS-7 Saddler'	1962	6 000	1 × 5 Mt	190	190	190	130	30	2	—	—	—	—
	'SS-8 Sasin'	1963	6 000	1 × 5 Mt	19	19	19	19	19	—	—	—	—	—
	'SS-9 Scarp'	1966	6 500	1 × 10–20 Mt	288	288	288	248	188	128	68	—	—	—
	'SS-11 mod. 1'	1966	5 700	1 × 1 Mt	990	1 010	1 030	950	860	750	640	580	580	520
	'SS-11 mod. 2' conv.	1973	..	1 × 1 Mt										
	'SS-11 mod. 3' conv.	1973	..	3 × 200 kt (MRV)										
	'SS-11 mod. 3'	1973	..	3 × 200 kt (MRV)										
	'SS-13 Savage'	1969	4 400	1 × 1 Mt	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
	'SS-18 mod. 1/mod. 3'	1976	5 500	1 × 10–20 Mt	—	—	—	60	120	180	240	308	308	308
	'SS-18 mod. 2' conv.	1977	..	8 × 500 kt (MIRV)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	'SS-19' conv.	1976	5 000	6 × 500 kt (MIRV)	—	—	—	80	120	180	240	300	300	360
	'SS-17' conv.	1977	..	4 × 500 kt (MIRV)	—	—	—	—	50	100	150	150	150	150
ICBM total: U.S.					1 054	1 054	1 054	1 054	1 054	1 054	1 053	1 052	1 052	1 052
U.S.S.R.					1 547	1 567	1 587	1 547	1 447	1 400	1 398	1 398	1 398	1 398
Total, long-range bombers and missiles: U.S.					2 140	2 100	2 079	2 058	2 058	2 058	2 057	1 976	2 000	1 919
U.S.S.R.					2 280	2 384	2 464	2 496	2 460	2 445	2 475	2 504	2 504	2 504
Nuclear warheads														
<i>Independently targetable warheads on missiles:</i>					U.S.	5 210	5 678	6 410	6 842	7 130	7 274	7 273	7 000	7 022
					U.S.S.R.	2 124	2 228	2 308	3 160	3 894	4 393	4 937	5 920	6 848
<i>Total warheads on bombers and missiles, official U.S. estimates:</i>					U.S.	6 784	7 650	8 500	8 400	8 500	9 000	9 200	9 200	9 000
					U.S.S.R.	2 200	2 500	2 500	3 300	4 000	4 500	5 000	6 000	7 000

TABLE 2: Total NATO and Warsaw Pact Manpower

U.S.S.R.	3,705,000
Bulgaria	148,000
Czechoslovakia	196,500
GDR (East Germany)	166,000
Hungary	106,000
Poland	317,000
Romania	181,000

Warsaw Pact Total: 4,819,500

U.S.	2,116,800
Belgium	93,500
Britain	327,600
Canada	82,858
Denmark	31,200
France	492,850
FRG (West Germany)	495,000
Greece	206,500
Italy	370,000
Luxembourg	690
Netherlands	103,957
Norway	42,100
Portugal	66,426
Spain	347,000
Turkey	569,000

NATO Total: 5,345,481

TABLE 3: NATO and Warsaw Pact Defense Spending

U.S.S.R.	\$94.6 billion ⁵
Bulgaria	\$1.346 billion
Czechoslovakia	\$3.796 billion
GDR (East Germany)	\$7.39 billion
Hungary	\$1.318 billion
Poland	\$5.41 billion
Romania	\$1.4 billion

Warsaw Pact Total: \$115.26 billion

U.S.	\$215.9 billion*
Belgium	\$2.878 billion
Britain	\$26.2 billion
Canada	\$5.71 billion
Denmark	\$1.148 billion
France	\$22.677 billion
FRG (West Germany)	\$22.68 billion
Greece	\$2.27 billion
Italy	\$9.115 billion
Luxembourg	\$.042 billion
Netherlands	\$4.65 billion
Norway	\$1.65 billion
Portugal	\$.844 billion
Spain	\$3.65 billion
Turkey	\$2.63 billion

NATO Total: \$322.044 billion

*Scheduled to rise to \$343 billion by 1986.

that this was the first major initiative of the Andropov era. The American response will dictate whether the new leadership can indeed focus on domestic aspirations or whether these are again to be postponed, amid belt-tightening and harsher leadership.⁴

In the strategic sphere, Andropov's proposals would have been music to the ears of President Reagan's three immediate predecessors, Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter. He suggested a 25 percent reduction, leading to superpower equality in terms of delivery vehicles (land- and sea-based missiles and bombers) and in terms of actual warheads. On the contentious issue of "Euromissiles," Andropov offered to slash SS-20 missile numbers to the level of British and French deterrents, providing that the

United States would desist from the planned West European deployment of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles. The specter of the Pershing 2 is, of course, crucial to Moscow; its threat constitutes one of the two core arguments of Soviet hardliners.

The NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) position, that Pershing 2 deployment would merely offset SS-20 potential, has never been acceptable to Moscow. Soviet leaders viewed the SS-20's as newer-model replacements for the older SS-4's and 5's. Yes, they were mobile, which their predecessors were not, but this would not constitute a threat if NATO were truly a defensive alliance. A NATO first strike would be able to take out stationary targets but not mobile ones; a Soviet first strike, on the other hand, would surely include the immediate launching of stationary missiles that might otherwise be exposed to counter-attack. Yes, the SS-20's were also more accurate, but this might also be construed as benefiting a potential enemy, since there would be less need for large yields and less "collateral damage." Moscow insisted that its Euromissiles were a reasonable offset to British and French nuclear force structures, and to America's Forward Based Systems (FBS) of carrier-borne nuclear-armed planes capable of striking Soviet territory.

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⁴For a complementary analysis based on interviews with Roy Medvedev and other "dissidents," see Joseph Kraft, "Letter from Moscow," in *The New Yorker*, January 31, 1983.

⁵The official Soviet figure works out to about \$26 billion. The Central Intelligence Agency's computation is about \$198.64 billion, based on "dollar-costing," and acceptance of the politically appointed B-team's 1976 decision that in-house agency evaluations of the real cost to the Soviet economy must be doubled. The decision's logical corollary was that Moscow's military industries must be judged only half as efficient as previously presumed, but its political impact in the United States was crucial to the development of a more awesome specter of Soviet resolve. The serious reader is urged to refer to Franklyn D. Holzman's "Soviet Military Spending: Assessing the Numbers Game," in *International Security*, spring, 1982, pp. 78-101; see also the discussion in Jacobsen, *op. cit.*, ch. 3. The difficulty in assessing Soviet spending is explained in *The New York Times*, March 3, 1983, p. A1, "C.I.A. Analysts Now Said to Find U.S. Overstated Soviet Arms Rise."

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"The conjunction of the end of an era in the Soviet leadership, a prevailing sense that Soviet leaders had to do something new to get their economy on track, and a heightened challenge from the United States produced a natural uncertainty in Moscow . . . and . . . a 'debate' over the nature of the American threat."

Soviet-American Diplomacy at the End of an Era

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SOVIET-American relations reached new lows in 1981–1982. The Soviet Union found itself confronted by a new, ideological American government determined to strengthen United States defense capabilities and to lead its allies to more vigorous competition with the Soviet Union.* This resurgent competition came at an awkward time for Moscow. It faced continued difficulties within its military and economic alliance systems, most specifically in Poland.

It continued to be frustrated by its exclusion from the political process in the Middle East, a fact brought dramatically and embarrassingly to world attention by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982, which drove out one Soviet client, the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), and humiliated another, Syria, by defeating Soviet tanks and air defenses employed by Syria's armed forces. The Soviet Union's own army seemed bogged down in a prolonged counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan. Clients in Ethiopia, Angola and Nicaragua faced stiffer challenges.

Moscow tried to improve its relations with Beijing, but the Chinese set very tough conditions—reduction of Soviet military pressure on China, concessions in Afghanistan, less support for its Vietnamese ally, and reduction of Soviet military forces along the mutual border.

Because Soviet policy in the Far East had also contributed to increased military insecurity in Japan, a new Japanese leadership appeared prepared to bring that country's advanced technology more decisively

into the loose Western military "coalition" that had been provoked by Soviet military advances during the 1970's. All these developments occurred in the context of a revitalized American sense of competition, the principal element of which was President Ronald Reagan's drive to "rebuild" United States defenses.

Thus, the view of the West from Moscow seemed threatening when General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev died on November 10, 1982, and was replaced by Yuri Andropov. Much of the Soviet elite seemed beset by a profound sense of malaise. The economy seemed to have entered a secular decline in its traditional pattern of growth. There were persistent worries about nationality difficulties, especially in the republics bordering on the states of Central Asia, where resurgent Islamic fundamentalism threatened Soviet interests in the region and caused worry that it would "spill over" into the Islamic cultures inside the U.S.S.R.

All this unease provoked what appeared to be a consensus among the ruling elite of the Communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) that what the country needed was a hefty dose of "discipline." Discipline became the theme of the new Andropov leadership. It was evident in his first personnel actions, for example, the firing of the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), General Nikolai Shchelokov, and the appointment of Vitaliy Fedorchuk to that position. Fedorchuk had earlier replaced Andropov himself at the helm of the KGB when Andropov moved into the CPSU Secretariat in May, 1982.¹ He was clearly Andropov's man and was rumored in the Western press to have a mandate to clean up the MVD.

The discipline theme was evident in virtually every public speech by members of the leadership, especially as it related to the economy, and the idea of "labor discipline" was given dramatic emphasis on January 31, 1983, when Andropov paid an unannounced visit to the shop floor of the Sergo Ordzhonikidze machine-tool factory.² While such dramatic public gestures might not achieve much in the way of long-term corrections for the economy, preliminary evidence sug-

*The authors wish to thank Faith Klareich of the GSIS, University of Denver, for her valuable research on the history of Soviet arms control initiatives.

¹See the article by John Burns in *The New York Times* (hereafter NYT), December 18, 1982, p. 1.

²See Serge Schmemmann's report from Moscow, NYT, February 1, 1983, p. 1. Moscow radio and TV carried extensive coverage of this unusual meeting. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS), *Daily Report, Soviet Union*, February 1, 1983, pp. R1-R3. All central newspapers carried it on page one: see *Krasnaya zvezda* and *Pravda*, February 1, 1983.

gests that they did contribute to a short-term increase in productivity.³

From the viewpoint of Soviet-American relations, the decline in Soviet economic growth came at an awkward moment. The Reagan administration had increased United States defense spending in real terms by nearly 30 percent between the 1982 and 1984 budgets and proposed to increase it by 10.3 percent in real growth for 1984 alone.⁴ Moreover, the American challenge came at a time when Moscow was facing particularly costly decisions in its own defense programs—how to organize defense against a heavy cruise missile threat, how to counter the American Trident and whether to build large numbers of a new generation of nuclear-powered submarines, and a possible new generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Indeed, Soviet leaders confronted an overall trend, evident for some time in military technology, of increasing unit costs for weapons systems; this presumably put pressure on the traditional Soviet practice of attempting to offset Western technological advantages with quantitative superiority.

These problems in the interaction of Soviet and American military programs had two immediate effects in Moscow. First, they contributed to apparent controversy over national security. Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov had alluded to that controversy, specifically within the context of the Soviet Union's decision to announce a unilateral "no first use" policy for nuclear weapons at the United Nations in June, 1982. Ustinov's indirect reference was made even more dramatic by the convocation on October 27, 1982, of a meeting of all top Soviet military commanders. There Brezhnev seemed to assert party authority over national security matters, to tell his audience that the leadership understood the threat from the United States, that its strategy for meeting the threat—including its "peace program"—was the appropriate one, that the military was receiving adequate resources and first-rate weapons and that it was, therefore, incumbent on the uniformed military officers and the de-

³See Serge Schmemmann's report, *NYT*, February 11, 1983, p. 8; *Pravda*, February 10, 1983, p. 2, reported the meeting of the Council of Ministers on the January economic performance.

⁴See Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to Congress, FY 1984* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), pp. 61-66.

⁵See, for example, a report of a discussion at the "foreign policy section of the Scientific Council on US economic, political and ideological problems," S. Sh. A: *Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*, no. 5, May, 1982, pp. 119-127; no. 6, June, 1982, pp. 118-127; Vitaliy Zhurkin's article, *ibid.*, no. 11, November, 1981, pp. 3-16.

⁶See Reagan's speech to the United Nations, *NYT*, June 18, 1982, p. 1, and the briefing on the 1984 budget, *NYT*, February 1, 1983, p. 1.

⁷See Georgi Arbatov's article in *Pravda*, May 4, 1981, p. 6; Konstantin Chernenko's speech on the Lenin anniversary, *Pravda*, April 23, 1981, pp. 1-3.

fense industries to "be worthy" of the fact that the people "spare nothing" in equipping the armed forces "with the most advanced weapons and hardware." Some Soviet commentators argued that United States defense plans were deliberately designed to do "economic damage" to the Soviet Union, to lure it into an arms race on terms that it could not win.⁵

These signs of controversy in Soviet national security policy, of course, reflected the increased sense of competition between the superpowers. Some observers in the West thought Moscow was getting just what it deserved, that it had had things too much its own way during the 1970's when, as Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and President Reagan repeatedly argued, the Soviet Union built up its forces while the United States exercised a kind of "unilateral disarmament."⁶ Other Westerners took satisfaction from the Soviet protestations that the Reagan administration was behaving in an ideological manner. To these Western observers, Soviet leaders were protesting exactly the kind of behavior that they had for so long reserved to themselves.

THE DEBATE IN MOSCOW

The conjunction of the end of an era in the Soviet leadership, a prevailing sense that Soviet leaders had to do something new to get their economy back on track, and a heightened challenge from the United States produced a natural uncertainty in Moscow about how to read the Reagan administration. This uncertainty was reflected both in an evolving Soviet perception of United States policy during the first two years of the Reagan administration and in a "debate" over the nature of the American threat.

For a time after the inauguration of President Reagan, Soviet commentary, including speeches by members of the Politburo, seemed to hold open the possibility that Moscow could do business with Washington. The "more reasonable" elements in the new administration, it was suggested, would gradually assert themselves and there would be a return to some form of détente, albeit probably on a reduced scale, perhaps not too different from the policies of the last two years of President Jimmy Carter's administration.⁷ These leadership expressions of possible accommodation disappeared in the summer of 1981, and not even Soviet foreign policy specialists mentioned détente publicly after the imposition of U.S. sanctions following the declaration of martial law by Poland in December. During the first six months of 1982, Soviet commentary avoided even the most guarded expressions of hope that American policy would become more favorable to improved relations with the Soviet Union. The line in Soviet publications became increasingly hostile and polemical.

But Georgi Arbatov, head of the Institute for the United States and Canada and a man widely rumored

in the West to have close connections with Andropov, returned to a more differentiated discussion of United States policy in an article in *Pravda* on July 16.⁸ By late fall of 1982, the Soviet leadership seemed to have arrived at a consensus on United States policy and to have developed its strategy.⁹

During these nearly 18 months of uncertainty about how to interpret the Reagan administration, a variety of views were expressed in the Soviet media. These fell roughly into three "schools" of thought. One school argued that the United States was determined to mount a serious challenge to Soviet interests, to oppose "progressive" forces around the world, and to achieve that "military superiority" which would enable it to use military power or the threat of military power to achieve its political ends. But, this school averred, despite these intentions, the United States would be prevented from achieving its ends by "objective criteria": the peace movement in Europe and the United States, economic difficulties at home, and the gradual assertion of more dispassionate opinion.¹⁰ A second school agreed that the Reagan administration intended to achieve "military superiority" and political influence thereby, but argued that in fact the United States had actually not been successful in increasing its global position; rather it had weakened itself by its ideological positions and by what Moscow regarded as its dangerous military policy.¹¹ A third school in this Soviet discussion, represented mainly by the military, argued that the United States not only sought military superiority but was actually engaged in "material preparations" for a global military conflict, up to and including nuclear war.¹²

While the conclusions for Soviet policy were not often drawn in these public commentaries, it is possible to infer what recommendations may have been made. The last school, of course, seemed to require additional Soviet military preparations in face of the threat. The first two, on the other hand, probably underlay policy recommendations to "stay the course" with a Soviet strategy that mixed a continued Soviet military buildup with a vigorous "peace offensive" such as that

⁸*Pravda*, July 16, 1982, p. 3.

⁹The Arbatov position articulated in July was reflected in speeches by Chernenko in Tbilisi, *Pravda*, October 30, 1981, p. 2, and Andropov to the Central Committee plenum, *Pravda*, November 23, 1981, p. 1.

¹⁰See, for example, the Arbatov article in *Pravda*, July 16, 1982, and comments by people associated with the CPSU Central Committee: Leonid Zamyatin, *Literaturnaya gazeta*, June 30, 1982, p. 14 and Vitaliy Kobyshev on Czech television, *FBIS, Soviet Union*, August 30, 1982, pp. CC9-12.

¹¹The Chernenko speech in Tbilisi was the most authoritative articulation of this view. *Pravda*, October 30, 1982, p. 2.

¹²The leading spokesman for this view was chief of staff Nikolay Ogarkov. See his article in *Kommunist*, no. 10, July 1981, pp. 80-91, and an elaboration on these themes in *Vsegda v gotovnostikh zashchite otechestva* (Moscow: Military Press, 1982).

which had characterized the twenty-fourth (1971), twenty-fifth (1976) and twenty-sixth (1981) party congresses.

THE SOVIET POLICY CONSENSUS

This was, of course, at least part of the message taken by Brezhnev to the military leadership in his last major political statement on October 27. It was also Andropov's central theme in his first major political statement to the CPSU Central Committee plenum on November 22. Andropov placed his own policy squarely in the context of the last three party congresses; and in retrospect, it seems probable that Andropov himself was already playing a major role in the formation of that policy while he headed the KGB and especially after he was brought into the Politburo in 1973. He almost certainly played a major role in shaping the 1982 policy after the death of Mikhail Suslov in January and his transfer from the KGB to the party Secretariat at the May Central Committee plenum.

This Soviet strategy for dealing with the American challenge had the following central elements:

Publicly expressed skepticism that Moscow could do business with Washington, especially in arms control where the United States was consistently said to be using Soviet-American discussions as a cover for its own military buildup;

Continued discussion in the major arms control forums—in negotiations over intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), strategic arms reduction talks (START) in Geneva, mutual and balanced force reduction talks (MBFR) in Vienna—while taking the public initiative in all three sets of negotiations to convince Western publics that Moscow was more reasonable and more determined to achieve arms reductions than the United States;

A public campaign of threats to "respond" with new missiles to counter United States cruise missiles and the MX (missile experimental) if Washington went forward with them;

A vigorous policy of differentiated détente, whereby the Soviet Union would accept the deterioration in Soviet-American relations but would attempt to offset the damage to Soviet interests caused by the decline in superpower relations by improving its relations with America's allies, thereby weakening the United States global position;

Exploring a series of geopolitical initiatives—with China, Japan, Afghanistan and Europe—which, while not surrendering any fundamental positions, would reinforce the peace movement in the West, would give impetus to differentiated détente with those allies of the United States who could be impressed by Moscow's "reasonableness" in the global competition, and would include an implicit threat to the Americans that the Soviet Union retained options for advancing its own interests in the global competition.

Differentiated détente required a preoccupation with Europe in Soviet foreign policy. Increasingly, the United States has been drawn into a public diplomatic contest in Europe. While the intensity is new, the focus of policy is not. Since the end of World War II, Europe has been the dominant concern of both Soviet and American policymakers. During the late 1970's, the perception grew within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that the Soviet military buildup had endangered the balance of forces between the superpowers generally and in Europe in particular. Especially the deployment of the SS-20 missile in the latter half of the decade seemed to threaten a qualitative Soviet military advantage, and that perception led to the "dual decision" by NATO in December, 1979. By that decision, NATO would deploy 572 Pershing 2 single-warhead missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) to offset the three-warhead MIRVed (multiple independently targeted) SS-20's. But NATO also pledged itself to support a process of Soviet-American negotiations to reduce theater nuclear weapons (TNF), and the deployments were to go forward only if the negotiations did not successfully resolve the problem.

THE ZERO OPTION

At the official level, the United States and the Soviet Union conducted informal discussions in Geneva in the fall of 1980, and began actual negotiations on November 29, 1981. The United States position was made public in a speech by President Reagan on November 18, 1981, outlining the so-called zero option by which NATO would deploy no Pershing 2 or GLCM missiles in return for the destruction of all Soviet SS-20's and the SS-4's and 5's (the older theater missiles being replaced by the SS-20's).**

The Soviet position had actually evolved gradually since the fall of 1979. A speech in Berlin by President Brezhnev in October, 1979 announced that the Soviet Union was prepared to reduce the number of medium-range ballistic weapons deployed in western areas of the Soviet Union "only if no new missiles are deployed in Western Europe." Accompanying this offer was a warning concerning the possible consequences of any NATO decision to deploy United States medium-range missiles on European soil.¹³ Since then, Soviet diplomatic and propaganda efforts have primarily been directed toward preventing the implementation of the NATO decision.

**For excerpts from this text see p. 222.

¹³*Pravda*, October 5, 1979. Brezhnev also said that Soviet troops and tanks would be withdrawn from East Germany.

¹⁴*Pravda*, February 24, 1981.

¹⁵For Soviet representations of the Western response see *Pravda*, March 14, 1981, and March 25, 1981.

¹⁶*Pravda*, July 25, 1981.

¹⁷*Pravda*, November 24, 1981. See also *Pravda*, February 9, 1982.

General Secretary Brezhnev's report to the twenty-sixth congress of the CPSU in February, 1981, enunciated the principal themes of this campaign: conventional arms reductions, nuclear-free zones, the growing potential for nuclear war, and, perhaps most important, a specific proposal for a moratorium on the deployment in Europe of new medium-range ballistic missiles by NATO countries and the U.S.S.R.¹⁴

In contrast with earlier Soviet support of some kind of nuclear freeze in Europe, this time a principal motivation was to protect a Soviet military advantage, rather than to buy time or to head off what Moscow thought would be a decided disadvantage. Acceptance by the West of a freeze was highly unlikely, given NATO's perception of its military weakness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in both conventional and theater nuclear armaments. However, there was still propaganda value in taking these positions, and the Soviet strategy of differentiated détente meant undertaking efforts to influence public opinion in Europe and the United States so that NATO's planned deployment could at least be delayed.

As might be expected, the immediate Western response to the freeze initiative was negative, focusing primarily on the way in which such a moratorium would perpetuate a decided Soviet advantage.¹⁵ Perhaps partly as a result of the hostile Western reaction, in June Brezhnev stated Soviet willingness to "halt the development of its medium-range missiles in the European part of the USSR on the day that talks begin on the substantive issues." This would be the case only if the United States agreed not to deploy the Pershing 2 and cruise missile systems in Europe.

In July, 1981, an important article in *Pravda* by Defense Minister Ustinov spelled out in detail the Soviet perspective on the arms race in general and the situation in Europe in particular. Regarding the moratorium proposal, which he claimed was a "major step of good will," Ustinov argued that the idea was "based on the rough equality of medium-range nuclear arms that has existed between NATO and the U.S.S.R. in Europe for several years—about 1,000 delivery vehicles on each side."¹⁶

Initially, the idea had been one of a mutual freeze; then Brezhnev had expressed the willingness of the Soviet Union to stop deployment in the European part of the U.S.S.R. in exchange for negotiations and a pledge of no NATO counterdeployments. During his visit to West Germany in November, 1981, the General Secretary pushed the idea of a freeze but added:

If the other side agrees to the moratorium . . . as an act of good will, we would unilaterally reduce a certain number of our medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the U.S.S.R.¹⁷

A few months later, this promise to halt deployments unilaterally in exchange for a moratorium was expanded to a unilateral moratorium.

Now Brezhnev added a threat: if the decision to place "hundreds of new American missiles capable of hitting targets in the U.S.S.R." were to be implemented, then "this would compel us to take retaliatory steps that would put the other side, including the territory of the United States itself, in an analogous position."

Thus, while the "carrot" offered by Soviet leaders was steadily expanded, the "stick" was also made much more explicit. The Soviet media played on this theme in efforts to influence public opinion in the United States and in Europe, particularly in Germany, where the issue of the missile deployment had become a major political controversy.

STRATEGIC ARMS

The Soviet offer to freeze missile systems had always been directed toward the nuclear balance in Europe and did not apply to the balance of general strategic nuclear weapons between the Soviet Union and the United States. However, when Brezhnev appeared before the nineteenth congress of the Young Communist League in May, 1982, he not only spoke in some detail of the need for a moratorium in Europe on medium-range missiles, but also proposed an immediate freeze on strategic nuclear weapons. This represented the first time since the 1950's that the Soviet Union had expressed itself in favor of a complete moratorium on all medium and long-range nuclear weapons systems.

Brezhnev's speech attracted little attention in the West, principally because it was so obviously a public response to President Reagan's speech in Eureka, Illinois, on May 9. Reagan proposed a two-phase negotiation in START. In phase one, he proposed 1) to reduce missile warheads to equal ceilings at least a third below then current levels, and 2) to permit no more than half those warheads on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's). In phase two, he said the United States would "seek to achieve an equal ceiling of other elements of our strategic nuclear forces, including limits on ballistic missile throw-weight at less than current American levels." The Soviet Union later protested that these proposals were one-sided because their strategic force relied more on land-based ICBM's than the United States, which had a relatively greater percentage of its warheads at sea. Nonetheless, Reagan clearly had seized the high ground in the public diplomacy of START.

The START talks themselves began in Geneva on June 29 with the United States represented by retired Lieutenant General Edward Rowney and the Soviet Union by an experienced diplomat, Victor Karpov. On the second day of the talks, newspapers carried the details of what was said to be the United States proposal, i.e., to call for a reduction of warheads from

roughly 7,500 to 5,000. If the Soviet Union were to reduce to that number, and if only one-half of the warheads could be placed on land-based missiles, they would be required to reduce their ICBM force substantially and to increase their submarine-launched missiles (SLBM's). The Soviet leaders reportedly countered with a proposal that both sides reduce to 1,800 missiles and bombers, about a one-third reduction in their own force and a 10 percent reduction in United States forces.

At the turn of 1983, both sides seemed to have retained these negotiating positions in START. Possibly there was less urgency in START than in INF. Both sides had announced they would abide by the provisions of the unratified SALT II proposals, and although there was ambiguity with respect to whether such pledges extended to all the SALT II provisions, Moscow's emphasis in its public diplomacy was clearly on INF. The reason was simple—the timetable for deployment of the Pershing 2's and GLCM's made that set of issues the real contest. The Soviet Union wanted to force an agreement that would block further United States deployment in West Europe or, failing that, to create such political pressures in West Europe that deployment would be delayed and, ultimately, prevented.

Following Brezhnev's death, Andropov addressed arms control issues on November 22, in his first speech before the plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee. Andropov stated that Soviet foreign policy in general would continue to be guided by the decisions of the twenty-fourth, twenty-fifth, and twenty-sixth party congresses. He made no direct reference to INF, but he did bring up Brezhnev's suggestion of a moratorium on strategic weapons without mentioning Brezhnev by name.¹⁸

In his next major speech, on the occasion of the anniversary of the Soviet Union a month later, Andropov attacked the Reagan administration's record on arms control, twice calling for new proposals and movement from what he argued were unreasonable positions. He argued that the Soviet Union would

retain in Europe only as many missiles as are kept there by Britain and France . . . this means that the Soviet Union would reduce hundreds of missiles including dozens of the . . . SS-20.

Such proposals seemed to find credence in Europe, and the United States dispatched Vice President George Bush on a trip to allied capitals in late January,

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¹⁸*Pravda*, November 22, 1982, p. 1.

"Even if the nuclear freeze were somehow verifiable, it would diminish international security and crisis stability. . . . Despite rigorous criticism of the United States negotiating positions at the START and INF talks, international stability is more likely to be advanced by sensible compromises than by ill-advised public initiatives that have the effect of disarming American negotiators."

Soviet-American Arms Control Negotiations

BY NILS H. WESSELL

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SINCE the advent of the nuclear age the United States has been involved in a wide variety of arms control negotiations, several of which have led to significant bilateral or multilateral treaties limiting strategic nuclear weaponry.¹ Although such treaties are recent, precedent for them extends as far back as 1817, when the United States and Britain concluded the Rush-Bagot agreement setting strict ceilings on the deployment of their naval forces on the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain. Later, at the turn of the century, the ill-fated Czar Nicholas II took the initiative in convening international peace conferences in The Hague that won broad agreement to ban the use of poison gas, dum-dum bullets, and other advanced technologies of the day like balloon-launched bombs.

To the generation born at the end of the nineteenth century, the development, testing, deployment and use in World War I of such perversions of science as the tank, the submarine, the airplane and poison gas seemed to pose a unique and revolutionary threat to the well-being of mankind. Technology evidently has been fueling the arms race and outrunning the capabilities of diplomacy over a very long historical period.

In 1946, only months after the United States had demonstrated its capability in atomic weapons, Bernard Baruch unveiled a dramatic, if ultimately futile, plan to invest an international authority with the exclusive right to own or control all present and future atomic energy capabilities. Acting as the United States representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the financier proposed the destruction of all nuclear weapons, an act of renunciation that would have ended the United States atomic monopoly. Despite overwhelming support from United Nations members, the plan failed, running aground on the opposition of the Soviet Union, which objected to verification provisions and the prospect of a freeze on the development of its own nuclear know-how. Three years later, the Soviet Union conducted its first

nuclear test, shocking a complacent American public confident of United States technological superiority. The experience would be repeated in 1957, when the Soviets demonstrated their superior delivery-system technology, boosting an artificial satellite into earth orbit. The years thereafter witnessed a rash of proposals, especially from the Soviet Union, for "general and complete disarmament"; the very comprehensiveness of these proposals was made possible by the unlikelihood of their adoption.

Not surprisingly, perhaps, the first arms limitation treaty after 1945 banned an activity no one contemplated in a place no one inhabited. The Antarctic Treaty (1959) prohibited the militarization of the South Pole. It became a precedent for similar "non-armament" treaties outlawing nuclear weapons in outer space (1967), in Latin America (1968), and on the seabed (1972). The successful conclusion of these agreements suggests a general principle of arms control: the more remote the military threat, the easier its limitation. Thus the Outer Space Treaty outlaws military maneuvers on the moon, where, even if they took place, no country's vital interests would be threatened. Similarly, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed in 1978 to ban the hostile use of environmental modification techniques. Under the treaty the parties pledge to refrain from changing climatic patterns, ocean currents, the ozone layer or the ecological balance for hostile purposes.

In the case of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and its protocols (given impetus by the Cuban missile crisis), the one Latin American state that the historical record suggested was most likely to serve as a launchpoint for nuclear weapons—Cuba—has refused to sign. But the treaty creating a Latin American nuclear free zone created a regional precedent for a global nonproliferation accord signed later that year.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed in 1968 by the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, came four years after China became the fifth nuclear weapon state. Although the NPT has effectively reinforced other political-military considerations that have thus far deterred any signatory state from

¹For the texts of United States arms control agreements, see *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations* (Washington, D.C.: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1982).

testing a nuclear weapon, nonsignatories like India, Israel and the Republic of South Africa have either tested a nuclear device or assembled all the parts necessary for such an explosion.² Even universal adherence to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty³ would fail to prevent the near-nuclear states from developing, producing and stockpiling nuclear weapons up to the testing stage. Safeguards developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna and applied to nonnuclear signatories, however, have sought to prevent plutonium from being diverted from nuclear power reactors to weapons use.

Although a comprehensive test ban continues to elude international agreement, thereby undercutting efforts to limit nuclear proliferation, significant limits on testing have been negotiated and, when convenient, ignored. For two decades, the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963) has prohibited nuclear explosions in three environments: in outer space, under water and, most critically in light of the radioactive fallout created by nuclear tests at the time, in the atmosphere. Although 123 countries have ratified or signed this important accord, France and China have refused to sign. The test limitation was further strengthened by the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) signed in 1974 (not yet ratified by the United States) and the companion treaty governing peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE's), signed in 1976. Under the TTBT, which the United States and the Soviet Union have pledged to observe, the United States and Soviet Union may not test nuclear weapons underground having a yield above 150 kilotons, a level high enough to permit testing of the relatively small MIRV (multiple, independently targeted reentry vehicle) warheads planned for the Trident II missile and the MX missile.

Moreover, since 1974, the Soviet Union has conducted several tests above the 150-kiloton limit.⁴ The PNE treaty, committing the two countries not to conduct nuclear explosions above this yield at locations removed from weapon test sites, includes provision for

verification by on-site inspection in the event of a group explosion the aggregate of which exceeds 150 kilotons. The treaty, accordingly, may mark a significant step by the Soviet Union in the direction of accepting increasingly "cooperative" means of verifying arms control accords.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Chemical and biological warfare agents represent an area where arms control efforts would superficially seem to have been successful. The 1925 Geneva Protocol outlaws the use of chemical and biological weapons in war, and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, ratified by both superpowers, bans the development, production, stockpiling or acquisition of both biological agents and toxins (substances acting like chemicals but produced by biological processes). Moreover, since 1976 the United States and the Soviet Union have been negotiating at the United Nations Committee on Disarmament on an accord to prohibit the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of chemical warfare agents and have reached substantial agreement. But in the absence of agreement on the verification of destruction of stockpiles and production facilities, no treaty has been signed. (In February, 1983, the administration of President Ronald Reagan submitted a detailed outline for such a treaty.)

Unfortunately, the entire array of international restraints in this area has been undermined by overwhelming evidence that the Soviet Union and its allies have been making widespread use of chemical and toxin weapons in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea in direct violation of both the Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.⁵ Afghan refugees and defecting Soviet soldiers stationed in Afghanistan have reported that chemical warfare units are to be found throughout that occupied country. One hundred percent lethal, flesh-softening toxic agents and other deadly chemical compounds have been sprayed indiscriminately from airplanes and delivered by rockets and artillery against resistance forces and even presumed sympathetic civilian settlements. Direct physical evidence has confirmed these reports.

The outbreak of an epidemic of fatal anthrax outside Sverdlovsk in April, 1979, that was probably caused by an explosion at a germ warfare factory rather than by tainted meat (as claimed by the Soviet Union), has deepened suspicions that the Kremlin has long been in flagrant violation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.⁶ Not unexpectedly, the result has been to call into question the Soviet Union's good faith as a negotiating partner in all areas of arms control where means of verification are less than ironclad.

In a less controversial area, that of rapid and dependable communication between Soviet and American leaders to reduce the risk of nuclear war by acci-

²Walter Schutze, "A World of Many Nuclear Powers," in Franklyn Griffiths and John C. Polanyi, eds., *The Dangers of Nuclear War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979).

³United States agreement to the treaty has been blocked by the doubts of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over both the merits and verifiability of an accord and by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

⁴A charge made by Robert T. Grey, then Acting Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in Alan F. Neidle, ed., *Nuclear Negotiations: Reassessing Arms Control Goals in U.S.-Soviet Relations* (Austin: University of Texas, 1982), p. 79. For another view, see *Scientific American*, October, 1982, p. 47ff and *The New York Times*, March 8, 1983, p. C1.

⁵United States, Department of State, *Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan: An Update*, Report from Secretary of State George P. Shultz, November, 1982.

⁶Leslie Gelb, "Mystery of Soviet Anthrax Epidemic Could Hinder Future Arms Control Talks," *International Herald Tribune*, December 3, 1981.

dent or miscalculation, results have been easier to achieve. Prompted by the October, 1962, confrontation over the clandestine installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba, Washington and Moscow signed a memorandum eight months later establishing a direct communications link involving two terminal points with teletype machines and 24-hour-a-day duplex wire telegraph and radiotelegraph circuits. The original "hot line" understanding was revised in 1971 in the course of the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) talks to provide for two satellite communications circuits that became operational seven years later.

Also in 1971, the superpowers concluded the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, requiring each side to improve technical safeguards against the unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons. Each state committed itself to giving advance notification of plans to launch any missile in the other's direction and to warn the other in event of incidents such as the apparent detection by early warning systems of incoming missiles that might lead to a nuclear exchange.

On the political level, President Richard M. Nixon and General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev further pledged in the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War that they would

act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations, as to avoid military confrontations, and as to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war. . . .

This general declaration was supplemented by a mutual commitment to "refrain from the threat or use of force against the other Party, against the allies of the other Party and against other countries, in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security." If the risk of nuclear war were to arise in these contexts, Washington and Moscow were to undertake "urgent consultations." Signed in June, 1973, these general declarations of intent together with those in the Basic Principles of Relations, signed at the 1972 Moscow Summit, were inevitably ignored when the Soviet Union's Arab allies attacked Israel in the Yom Kippur War four months later.

At this time, two sets of multilateral East-West negotiations were initiated, aiming at the political and military stabilization of Europe. Preparations were begun for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), as a result of which the heads of state signed the Helsinki accords in 1975. These accords confirmed Europe's postwar boundaries and called for a freer flow of information and people across national boundaries. The Helsinki Final Act also provided for such confidence-building measures of an arms control nature as prior notification of major military maneuvers. Large-scale Soviet military maneuvers in and around Poland in 1981 and the Soviet-instigated imposition of martial law in Poland in De-

cember, 1981, directly violated these provisions.

The second multilateral talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe, have dragged on for a decade in Vienna without final agreement. Both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact countries have agreed that conventional force reductions should result in a common ceiling of 900,000 troops on each side, no more than 700,000 of which would be ground forces. But the Soviet Union, arguing that the Warsaw Pact deploys only 805,000 ground troops on the Central Front rather than the 960,000 estimated by NATO, contends it can reach the ceiling by making smaller reductions than NATO insists on. If the data base problem could be resolved, an MBFR agreement would likely come quickly. In the meantime each side offers smaller pullbacks.

Although collectively these Soviet-American understandings constitute an impressive body of agreed principles and practices (the record of observance aside), the SALT I agreements limiting offensive nuclear arms and defensive missile systems represent the most far-reaching set of arms restraints ever to go into force. Soviet participation in the SALT talks, initiated in 1969 after the briefest of delays caused by the Warsaw Pact invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia, was probably motivated by Moscow's desire to achieve several ambitious objectives: 1) to slow the modernization of United States forces, especially to prevent large-scale ABM (anti-ballistic missile) deployments; 2) to codify strategic parity with the United States and win international recognition of its equal status as a superpower; 3) to promote détente as a means of acquiring access to Western (especially American) technology, credits and agricultural products; 4) to offset the incipient United States accommodation with the People's Republic of China; and 5) to reduce the uncertainties and hazards born of an arms race with a technologically and economically superior adversary.

As for the Americans, the administrations of Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon initiated the SALT negotiations in response to the American need to brake the momentum of the Soviet strategic buildup, even then massive in quantitative terms. They also sought at SALT to alleviate the political and economic pressures generated by continued United States involvement in the Vietnam War. Both parties probably tried also to reduce the prospects of nuclear confrontation caused by an unrestrained arms race.

One of two parts of SALT I, the Interim Agreement limiting offensive arms froze the number of fixed, land-based ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) launchers at existing levels, 1,054 for the United States and 1,618 for the Soviet Union (a number the Soviets refused to confirm or deny). Again quantitatively advantaged, Moscow was permitted 950 SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) launchers on 62 sub-

marines while the United States was limited to 710 SLBM launchers on 44 boats. To exercise the option to build up to these levels from then-existing lower numbers, each side had to retire an equal number of ICBM's (an option the Soviet Union fully exercised and the United States did not). As a result, the Interim Agreement codified a nearly 40 percent Soviet numerical advantage in ICBM's and SLBM's. Offsetting this disparity at the time were a larger United States bomber force (bombers were left unregulated) and what turned out ultimately to be a diminishing United States asset of qualitative superiority in such areas as multiple warhead technology and missile accuracy. In light of subsequent negotiations at SALT II and the Intermediate Nuclear Force talks now under way, the Soviet Union appended a Unilateral Statement, rejected by the United States, claiming the right to a larger-than-permitted SLBM force in the event the NATO allies of the United States increased the number of their SLBM submarines beyond then-existing levels. In effect, Moscow claimed the right of compensation for any growth in British and French forces, even though the latter operated independent of the NATO command.

During the two and one-half years of SALT I negotiations, it became clear that the Soviet Union was preoccupied with stopping the deployment of a defensive American ABM system. At one point Moscow, aware that United States ABM technology could quickly reverse its lead in deployed ABM's, proposed an ABM-only agreement. But the United States insisted on the essential linkage between offensive and defensive limits in view of the momentum of Soviet offensive programs.

The ABM Treaty (of unlimited duration in contrast to the five-year term of the Interim Agreement) and the subsequent Protocol adopted in 1974 restricted each country to a single ABM site holding a maximum of 100 interceptor missiles and 100 launchers. Indicative of the effectiveness of this arms control measure, the United States ultimately closed down its only ABM site, and Moscow chose not to expand its relatively crude system of 64 ABM's around Moscow. Associated treaty provisions blocked qualitative improvements in ABM systems by prohibiting the development, testing and deployment of rapid-reload launchers and multiple ABM warheads.

Although some observers had hoped that the ABM Treaty would make unnecessary the deployment by each side of vast new offensive systems, the absence in the Interim Agreement of any limits on the development of multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's) led to explosive growth in the number of warheads on both sides. SALT I had capped the quantitative arms race but only at the expense of permitting its rechanneling into such qualitative areas as warhead fractionation and guidance improvements.

In the future, if ABM systems are developed on new "physical principles" such as directed energy weapons like lasers or charged particle beams, the ABM Treaty requires only that limitation of such systems be "discussed." An ABM race remains a possibility.

THE SALT AGREEMENTS

The SALT I agreements unquestionably made a significant and innovative contribution in the area of verification. By establishing the practice of verification by "national technical means" (NTM's) such as reconnaissance satellites, electronic and radar surveillance, by pledging to avoid concealment measures impeding verification, and by committing themselves not to interfere with each other's surveillance systems, the United States and the Soviet Union provided mutual reassurance with respect to each other's intentions and created a valuable precedent for future arms control agreements. At the same time, however, Soviet military writers never endorsed the United States strategy of mutual assured destruction, according to which the security of each country would be enhanced by mutual vulnerability, a principle which, if accepted, would tend to restrain the arms race. Still, Soviet willingness to forgo a "thick" defensive system against United States ICBM's and SLBM's suggested an implicit recognition that rote incantations of traditional war-winning doctrines reflected more the need to maintain internal élan than a blueprint for an imminent disarming first strike.

In line with the Interim Agreement's call for continued efforts to limit strategic offensive arms, the SALT II talks began before the ink was dry on the SALT I accords. In fact, broad United States objectives at SALT II were set during congressional debate on SALT I. The United States Congress, approving the Interim Agreement, appended an amendment offered by Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) urging the President

to seek a future treaty that, *inter alia*, would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union. . . .

The Congress also insisted that a "vigorous research and development and modernization program" was essential to attaining a "more permanent and comprehensive" SALT II Treaty.

President Gerald R. Ford, meeting with Brezhnev at Vladivostok in late 1974, won Soviet agreement to the principle of an equal aggregate of 2,400 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (including bombers in addition to ICBM and SLBM launchers) and an equal aggregate limit of 1,320 on MIRVed launchers. But the two sides continued to disagree on whether the range of the new Soviet Backfire bomber was intercontinental and therefore subject to the ceiling of 2,400 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDV's). Nor could

they agree on the cruise missile, which Moscow sought to ban or limit sharply because United States cruise missile technology was far ahead of its own.

On assuming office in 1977, President Jimmy Carter declared his dissatisfaction with the high level of nuclear arms allowed under this approach and called for more ambitious reductions to 1,800 SNDV's and 1,100 MIRVed launchers. When presented with this suggestion by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance in March, Soviet leaders flatly rejected the proposal on grounds that drastic reductions, including a reduction in the number of Soviet heavy missiles and the absence of limits on cruise missiles, would disproportionately advantage the United States. Moscow also rejected the United States fallback offer of an agreement based on the Vladivostok accord, exempting both cruise missiles and Backfire bombers from any limits.

After two years of arduous negotiation, President Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev signed a completed SALT II Treaty at the Vienna Summit in June, 1979. A complex and detailed agreement to remain in force through 1985, the treaty provided for equal ceilings on SNDV's (2,250 by the end of 1981), an equal aggregate limit of 1,320 MIRVed missile launchers and heavy bombers armed with long-range cruise missiles, an equal sublimit of 1,200 MIRVed missile launchers and a further sublimit of 820 MIRVed ICBM launchers for each side. A limit of 10 warheads per ICBM was designed to constrain Soviet development of a first-strike capability against the United States Minuteman force. Other provisions placed additional restraints on the two sides.

A protocol attached to the treaty, to be effective through 1981, temporarily banned the deployment of mobile ICBM launchers (since they were easy to conceal) and both ground-based and sea-based cruise missile launchers with long ranges (on Soviet insistence).

Although it was the technically and politically impressive culmination of seven years' work, SALT II never came to a ratification vote in the United States Senate. Inherent weaknesses in the treaty, the growing vulnerability of United States ICBM's, and external events conspired in its de facto repudiation. Critics asserted that the treaty would detract from strategic stability. Because the treaty limited launchers instead of missiles, the Soviet Union would be permitted to manufacture and store as many missiles as it wished for later reloading. Opponents also argued that codification of the Soviet monopoly on heavy missiles, which posed the greatest threat to the survivability of Minuteman, failed to curb Soviet first-strike capabilities, permitting the continued undermining of crisis stability. Limits on the range and production rate of the Soviet Backfire bomber, covered in an exchange of notes, were assailed as insufficient and excessively informal. Several Senators also questioned the verifiability of key provisions affecting limits on missile mod-

ernization, fractionation, and throw-weight (weight of the reentry vehicle with its warhead package).

Perhaps more important, the SALT II Treaty was submitted to the Senate at a time of growing concern that the Soviet Union had increasingly been able to tip the nuclear balance in its favor and that the treaty would restrain United States counteraction (Soviet leaders asserted that the then-envisioned MX basing mode was disallowed by the treaty) while permitting Moscow to develop an entire new generation of ICBM's.

The sense of public disquiet concerning United States national security policies was powerfully reinforced by the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the subsequent soaring of oil prices, the helplessness of the United States government during the prolonged ordeal of American hostages in Iran, the administration's ability to live with what it had declared to be the "unacceptable" presence of a Soviet "combat brigade" in Cuba and, finally, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979. President Carter remarked that the latter event had given him greater insight into Soviet intentions than any prior experience in his tenure in office, and he withdrew the treaty from Senate consideration.

THE REAGAN VIEW

President Reagan, who had campaigned against détente in 1976 and against SALT II in 1980, assumed office with an apparently wary attitude toward arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. The President and his chief aides, agreeing to abide by the terms of SALT II provided the Soviets did so, regarded arms control less as an end in itself than as part of an overall national security policy. Accordingly, they delayed resumption of talks with the Soviet Union for 18 months while winning congressional support for an ambitious strategic modernization program. The administration meanwhile devised an entirely new approach to what it termed the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), leaving Soviet leaders to wonder wearily whether the American political process had enough continuity to permit the successful conduct of protracted negotiations.

In May, 1982, the administration announced its START proposal, aimed at achieving sharp reductions rather than freezing present deployments, the alternative first embodied in SALT I and proposed last year by both the Soviet Union and by the American nuclear freeze movement. Other broad United States

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"The continuing introduction of new military technologies inescapably leads both the United States and the Soviet Union to be uncertain about the adequacy of their military posture vis-à-vis one another. In an atmosphere of uncertainty, the phenomenon of 'worst case analysis' thrives, leading more often than not to demands in both nations for increased military research and development and more new weapons."

Advancing Military Technology: Recipe for an Arms Race

BY FRANKLIN A. LONG

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AN active search for new military technologies has characterized military commands for a very long time; but during the past century, spurred by the industrial revolution, the pace of change has greatly accelerated. In the United States a vigorous, sometimes frantic, wartime search for new weapons goes back at least to the Civil War.¹ During World War I, civilian scientists and engineers became considerably involved in military research and development and were responsible for the development of new military explosives, improved artillery propellants and new disabling and lethal chemicals.

However, the real acceleration of the contributions of civilian scientists and engineers to the military occurred during World War II. Civilian industries in the United States were extensively involved in the development and production of the vast numbers of artillery shells, ships, aircraft, tanks and trucks that the United States military demanded. Civilian scientists and engineers from United States universities, working in a wartime government agency called the Office of Scientific Research and Development, contributed greatly to such major new weapons as radar, proximity fuses, rockets, incendiaries, chemical weapons (which fortunately were never used) and, climactically, the atomic bomb.

After the war, many were convinced that science and technology would continue to be essential to the military. In his influential 1945 analysis for President Franklin D. Roosevelt, *Science: The Endless Frontier*, Vannevar Bush wrote, "In this war it has become clear beyond all doubt that scientific research is absolutely essential to national security," and he urged a "permanent, independent civilian-controlled organization—

to supplement and strengthen" the research of the military services. Bush's vision has come true, although not at all in the way he proposed. There is a very large United States civilian research and development (R&D) program on matériel for military use. However, it occurs predominantly within the industrial firms that produce the new weapons and other equipment that the military call for under contract for the Department of Defense.

The total United States effort on military R&D is very large; for the fiscal year 1982, federal expenditures on R&D for the military were \$25.6 billion. About 90 percent of this was funded by the Department of Defense (DOD); the remainder came from such other federal agencies as the Department of Energy and NASA (the National Aeronautics and Space Agency). Military research and development accounted for almost two-thirds of all federal expenditures on R&D. It also constituted about one-third of the entire United States R&D effort, public and private. Furthermore, within the budget for the Department of Defense, the fraction of expenditures devoted to R&D is impressively high. The total Defense Department budget of \$214 billion for FY 1982 contained \$85.4 billion for the acquisition of military matériel, and of this 23 percent was for R&D and 77 percent for procurement. If one includes the R&D of other federal agencies that are oriented toward the military, about 12 percent of all United States military expenditures are for R&D. This high level of spending for research and development for the military is not a recent phenomenon; it has characterized United States military expenditures for the past three decades.

The reason for this effort is the development and deployment of new military technologies. The consequence of 30 years of intensive efforts on new technologies is a United States military establishment that has far greater mobility, much faster reaction time, new weapons, and new reconnaissance and communication capabilities. To most of us, the nuclear bomb

¹Charges of mismanagement and foolish weapons procurement were rife during the Civil War, a topic that led the humorist Orpheus C. Kerr in 1861 to write one of his most biting pieces, "The Latest Improvements in Artillery," which is reprinted in E. B. White and K. S. White, *A Subtreasury of American Humor* (New York: Random House, 1945).

is the symbol of the new military era (and rightly so), but in fact the entire United States military program has been restructured by technology.

World War II was a watershed for the development of military technology in more ways than one. First, it demonstrated the great importance of newly discovered science in the development of technology. The discovery and elucidation of the science of nuclear fission in 1938 led directly to the nuclear bomb that destroyed Hiroshima in 1945. Other major new military technologies benefited from new science, e.g., radar, rocket fuels, proximity fuses, new explosives, magnetic mines, and homing torpedoes. Second, World War II demonstrated to the United States military the importance of an intimate and continuing interaction between research and development—an interaction that was already characteristic of much of United States civilian industry by 1940, including most of the industries that produced new matériel for the military.

Finally, the war itself amply demonstrated the dangers of new military technology in the hands of the enemy, for example, Germany's jet-engined aircraft and its V-1 and V-2 long-range rockets. The implicit message from these and other enemy technologies was that the United States had to counter them, or at least to compete. Because of the Berlin blockade, the Korean war and other events of the cold war, this seemed all the more important since the Soviet Union now loomed as a potential new enemy. In the early 1950's, Congress greatly increased military budgets, including those for R&D and for the procurement of new weapons. The military services in turn moved rapidly to strengthen their links with industry and to support basic scientific research in the universities, for example, by way of the newly established Office of Naval Research. By 1954, large peacetime military budgets with large funding for research and development were fully established in the United States.

The new postwar directions strongly affected the means of procurement of new weapons and other military matériel. The prewar system of Army arsenals and Navy shipyards that designed and manufactured military matériel was pretty well scrapped. Instead, virtually all manufacturing and most design and development were carried out by the industrial companies that specialized in military products (Boeing, Lockheed, McDonnell and others). Seventy percent of Defense Department funds for R&D were soon going to these industrial firms. The major R&D activities of the military services themselves were to identify operational needs for new technology, to let contracts for R&D on specified new hardware, to evaluate new designs, and to award production contracts for promising new technologies. Although ultimately the users of the new weapons would be the integrated military forces of Unified Commands, the separate military services remained responsible for the R&D and procure-

ment of the new systems that fell in their province. Each service also continued to operate its own R&D establishments.

Because of this large program of military R&D, the United States has been the world leader in the introduction of new military technology. As a group, the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) nations of West Europe have the capability to match the United States efforts but their military budgets and, in particular, their budgets for military R&D, have been considerably smaller. The Soviet Union has roughly matched the United States in its overall military expenditures and in expenditures for military R&D. However, the scientific and technical capabilities of the Soviet Union lag considerably behind those of the United States, and for this and associated reasons the Soviet Union has been a far less effective innovator. It is only a slight overstatement to say that in military technology the United States has consistently been the leader and the Soviet Union the follower.

This large and continuing United States emphasis on research and development for the military and on new military technology raises three important questions:

What has been the rationale for this United States commitment to R&D and new technology?

What have been the consequences for United States military capabilities and, in a larger sense, for national security and world stability?

What are the prospects for containment and control of the more destructive and destabilizing new technologies?

There is both a general and a specific answer to this question. Speaking generally, one can say that in moving strongly toward continued emphasis on new military technology after 1945, the United States was simply trying to capitalize on one of its major areas of "comparative advantage," its scientific and technological expertise. By the 1940's, the effective development of efficient new civilian technologies had become one of America's great strengths, as evidenced by the output of civilian products like commercial aircraft from Boeing and Douglas, chemicals from Dupont, communication devices from AT&T, and business machines from IBM. American university scholars performed at the forefront of scientific and technical research and trained large numbers of skilled scientists and engineers, most of whom went into industry. It was thus only natural for the military to emphasize new technologies.

Not only civilian scientist Vannevar Bush but also forward-looking military leaders saw a continuing need for civilian participation in research on military problems and for industrial participation in the development of new technology for the military. Thus Dwight D. Eisenhower, writing in 1946 as chief of staff of the United States Army, set policies in place calling

for "utilizing some of our industrial and technological resources as organic parts of our military structure," and asking for "close integration of civilian talent with military plans and developments."² As a consequence, several civilian-operated laboratories that had developed during the war, like Los Alamos and Sandia for atomic bombs and the Applied Physics Laboratory for naval weaponry, were continued and expanded after the war. But the major growth in the post-1945 period was direct contracting with United States civilian industries for military research and development, which, if successful, could lead to follow-on production contracts.

It is ironic that, in his 1961 farewell address to the nation, President Eisenhower felt it necessary to warn that

In the councils of government we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.³

In a sense, this warning is a tribute to the success of the 1946 policies that he had helped put in place. The chief reason for the warning in 1961 was not just the growth of military-industrial linkages, but the continued very large peacetime expenditures by the military and through them by the associated industries.

Since World War II, the major justification for large United States military expenditures has remained unchanged; it is the military and ideological confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. From this arises the specific rationale for continued emphasis on new military technology—the strongly felt American desire to maintain technological superiority over the Soviet Union. The need for this superiority is affirmed with as much vigor in the halls of Congress as in the Pentagon. The arguments for this policy usually start by identifying communism as an aggressive ideology aiming for world domination, with the Soviet Union as its major military and political arm. The principal threat is seen to be in Europe, where the Soviet Union has already imposed communism on several previously independent nations.

Militarily, the Soviet Union appears committed to very large armed forces, with massive numbers of tanks, guns, and aircraft and, more recently, with large supplies of nuclear weapons and a significant "blue water" navy. As the major Western non-Communist power, so goes the argument, the United States must take the lead in countering this threat. However,

United States strategy should not involve meeting the threat man by man and gun by gun; rather, the United States should apply its superior scientific, technological and industrial abilities. This approach, the United States military argue, can satisfy two needs. One is to assure continuing United States technological superiority; the other is, in the 1979 words of William Perry, then Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, "to prevent technological surprise; that is, to insure that the Soviets do not achieve a militarily significant breakthrough in a new weapon before we do. . . ." ⁴ Here, then, are the chief justifications for the continued large military expenditures on research and development and the continuing output of new, increasingly sophisticated military technologies.

There are other factors, however. Over the years since 1945, as large military expenditures have continued, a broad support base—political, economic and bureaucratic—has developed for military programs. The Department of Defense competes with the Department of State as the most influential unit of the executive branch of government. The Armed Services committees of Congress are influential and strongly pro-military. Finally, the defense industry is enormous and is economically important to almost every region of the country. The considerable momentum of the administration's military program may owe as much to this political and bureaucratic support as to objective analysis of military needs.

SECURITY AND STABILITY IMPLICATIONS

Every branch of the United States military services has developed and procured a continuing stream of new technology. Not only have war-fighting capabilities been increased; so have capabilities for communications, reconnaissance and command and control. Even when major weapons appear to remain the same (for example, aircraft carrier task forces or nuclear-armed Minuteman missiles), major continuing improvements have in fact taken place.


Some of the new technologies have been truly revolutionary: nuclear bombs, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and immensely more efficient electronics for communication, guidance and other needs. Other military technologies, where improvements appear to be more incremental, can over time become immensely more effective, like precision-guided munitions for battlefield use.

The overwhelmingly lethal and most dangerous new technology that the world is struggling with is the atomic bomb. Even the primitive nuclear bomb that was dropped from an airplane onto Hiroshima was about 10,000 times more destructive than an equal weight or volume of TNT. The destructiveness and lethality of these weapons arise partly from the conventional effects of blast, shock and fire, but lethality

²Dwight D. Eisenhower, memorandum to heads of staff on "Scientific and Technological Resources as Military Assets," quoted in Seymour Melman, *Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970).

³*Ibid.*, p. 237.

⁴Statement by Undersecretary of Defense W. J. Perry, in "The FY 1980 DOD Program for Research, Development and Acquisition," (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979).



also comes at much larger distances from the insidious effects of radioactive fallout. In the decades since World War II there has been another 100-fold improvement in the efficiency of nuclear explosives. Of even greater consequence, however, have been improvements in their delivery systems. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) can deliver in about 40 minutes a megaton-equivalent nuclear warhead to a target 6,000 miles away with an accuracy of around 200–300 yards. Alternatively, the ICBM can carry several smaller nuclear warheads, each delivered to a separate target with similar high accuracy. Nuclear warheads can be delivered by rockets, by aircraft, by artillery and by cruise missiles, and the launching site can be the ground, the air, or the ocean. Roughly 30,000 nuclear warheads are now available to the United States and the Soviet Union in about equal numbers.

The combination of immense destructiveness and long-range delivery systems means that every nation in the world is vulnerable to sudden destruction. The fact that almost all nuclear weapons are held by the United States and the Soviet Union means that in any war where these two nations are on opposite sides there will be a grave danger of escalation to an incredibly destructive all-out nuclear exchange. Neither nation can possibly want this result, but it is unclear whether it can be avoided for very long—unless the two nations work together to this end.

Since the military strive for the best technologies (to maintain technological superiority), the new military systems can be costly, both in development and in production. A good illustration of the steady flow of improved weapons and of the concomitant increased

costs is given in Figure 1 on costs for successive generations of United States tactical aircraft.⁵

Two aspects of this figure are dramatic: one is the large number of new models of fighter aircraft: 25 of them in 40 years; the other is the 100-fold increase (in current dollars) in the cost of a single fully equipped tactical aircraft. The latest models are, of course, far more effective fighting machines, but the tremendous increase in cost per unit has so reduced the total number of aircraft that can be purchased that the cost effectiveness of the superior technology becomes uncertain. The cost of the F-4 fighter is about one-fourth the cost of an F-15 in constant dollars. It is an interesting question whether two F-15's are more effective than eight F-4's. For final air superiority, perhaps, but for many important missions for tactical fighters, probably not.

Undersecretary of Defense W. J. Perry, in his 1979 report, listed several "barriers to applying technology." His list, with my italicized comments, follows:

Technology as a cost problem: *the very rapid increase in costs for most of the newer military technologies.*

Technology as a schedule problem: *the tendency for development up to the point of production to take longer for the newer, more sophisticated technologies.*

Technology as a two-edged sword: *a common sequence of action and reaction in which the United States develops and deploys an important new military technology, the Soviet Union soon also acquires it or something similar and deploys it, and the United States responds with a newer technology. This action and reaction is, of course, the recipe for an arms race, and a contribution to political instability.*

Technology as a problem for the user: *the new technologies are not always as effective as expected, nor are they always effectively utilized. Complexity and poor reliability are frequent problems, a recent example being the initially low reliability of the new, advanced jet engine for the F-15 aircraft.*

In military planning for new technology, neglecting consideration of the consequences if the enemy gets the same weapon or an effective counter is so prevalent that Herbert York has given it a name, "the fallacy of the last move," i.e., the fallacy of believing that the enemy will not respond.⁶ A striking case was the United States decision to deploy MIRV's (multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles), on the nation's ICBM's. Arms control advocates argued against the decision, pointing out that the United States would gain an initial advantage, but would be worse off if the Soviet Union also MIRVed its ICBM's. Subsequently, the Soviet Union did develop and deploy MIRV's, and both sides are less secure because this mutual deployment has significantly enhanced the advantages and hence the likelihood of a nuclear first strike.

The United States push for new military technology continues unabated, as apparently does that of the Soviet Union. Funds for military research and development have increased under the administration of President Reagan at an even more rapid rate than the rapidly increasing overall United States military bud-

⁵Perry, *op. cit.* "Then year dollars" refers to current dollar figures, not corrected for inflation.

⁶Herbert F. York, *The Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970).

get. The number of projected new major military systems is staggering: the MX missile, the Trident II missile, cruise missiles, the Pershing 2 missile, the B-1 bomber, the Stealth bomber, precision-guided missiles, new aircraft carriers, renovated battleships, and new systems for military command and control. The latest is President Reagan's controversial call for accelerated research on weapons to destroy incoming Soviet ICBM's in space, a program that is sure to elicit a Soviet response.

William Perry spoke of "barriers to new [military] technology." One can equally speak of political problems arising from the new technology. Three are particularly important and troublesome. First, most of the new technologies are rapidly disseminated to other nations of the world, and lead to worldwide tensions and instabilities. Iran and Iraq are fighting each other with Western-made and Soviet-made weapons; Syria and Israel recently did the same. Arms imports by developing nations increased eightfold from 1960 to 1980, and most of these imports were for very modern weapons.⁷

A second problem is the "technology arms race" that the United States and the Soviet Union are running. The direct financial impact of this is obvious and troublesome enough, but the secondary impacts may be of equal consequence—the comparative neglect of support for other elements of national security and national well-being, leading in the United States, for example, to decreases in federal funding for virtually all research and development programs other than those for the military. A related and serious problem is that the continuing introduction of new military technologies inescapably leads both the United States and the Soviet Union to be uncertain about the adequacy of their military postures vis-à-vis one another. In an atmosphere of uncertainty, the phenomenon of "worst case analysis" thrives, leading more often than not to demands in both nations for increased military R&D and more new weapons.

There is an appealing counterresponse, so far not very successful, to the pressures toward a technology arms race. This response seeks to slow down and eventually to stop the arms buildup by mutual Soviet-American agreements on significant programs of arms control and disarmament.

All the difficulties of the arms race suggest that both nations would greatly benefit from an accommodation that would enhance political stability, decrease the risk of war and reduce the burdens of their current military programs. But the needed accommodation has interrelated political and military components. It may be that the best approach is multifaceted, like the accommodations reached by United States President Richard Nixon and Soviet First Secretary Leonid

Brezhnev in 1972. Substantive measures of arms control will be an inescapable component, and this is a field where joint negotiations have had modest success. The question then becomes how to negotiate substantial arms control in the face of political suspicions and the momentum of the technological arms race.

The classic objectives of arms control are three: to reduce the risk of war, to reduce the costs of preparation for war, and to reduce the levels of death and destruction if war comes. The current global situation makes it evident that war is a serious threat to almost all areas of the globe. But even if one restricts the discussion to the United States-Soviet confrontation, or perhaps more broadly to that between the nations of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the threat of war is serious and the possible consequences of war are almost overwhelming.

Mutual suspicion and political tension between the two superpowers are high. The military forces of the two nations are large and, because of the new technologies of nuclear warheads and ICBM's, each nation threatens the other with overpowering destruction. Whatever small sense of national security exists in either nation lies in the deterrence to nuclear attack that is provided by an assured and devastating retaliatory second strike. Unhappily, continuing developments in military technology have tended to erode confidence in the nuclear deterrent. Here if ever, one would think, is a situation where serious measures of arms control would be in the mutual interest of both nations and would be strongly urged by all the threatened civilians.

Unfortunately, the difficulties in obtaining serious measures of arms control are also great. The momentum of the buildup of military forces is considerable, and the political power of the military-industrial complex that Eisenhower warned against is large in both nations. The impressive capabilities for generating new military technologies that the two nations have built up offer their own problems in negotiating arms control.

Just as technology is seen by the military as a "two-edged sword" in gaining military advantage, so it appears two-edged in negotiating arms control. The uncertainties that result from the flow of new technology complicate the negotiations, and new technologies themselves can threaten the stability of agreements that have been obtained. On the other hand, technology offers the possibility of less destabilizing alternative

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⁷Ruth Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures*, 1982 (Leesburg, Va.: World Priorities, 1982), p. 9.

BOOK REVIEWS

ON ARMS AND DIPLOMACY

STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF POSTWAR AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY. By *John Lewis Gaddis*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. 432 pages, notes, index and bibliography, \$25.00.)

STRATEGIC STUDIES AND PUBLIC POLICY. By *Colin S. Gray*. (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1982. 230 pages, notes and index, \$19.50.)

The last 37 years have seen the use, deployment and refinement of nuclear weapons; in this same period there has been no conflict on a world-wide scale. This is routinely attributed to the advent of nuclear weapons and the "balance of terror" they have imposed on the world. But beneath the surface of this explanation lies a diplomatic history that scholars and analysts have endeavored to decipher from a variety of perspectives. Both Gray and Gaddis look at the subject with an eye toward explaining the centrality of strategy in this postwar order.

Gaddis's is by the far the more ambitious and detailed work, tackling the permutations of containment strategies adopted by the United States since George Kennan formulated the concept. Gaddis avoids the running controversy on the meaning of containment; instead, he draws on Kennan's memoirs and unpublished archival material, including lectures delivered by Kennan at the National War College and Kennan's own notes and memoranda during his stint at the State Department. The rest of the volume is a slightly revisionist reading of the changes in the meaning of containment from Truman to Carter and how various administrations implemented the changing strategy.

Gaddis's major asset is his ability to explain without justifying. Colin Gray, on the other hand, is not interested in surveying the history of postwar strategy; instead, he wants to further his own theses on the possibilities of limited nuclear war, of arms control and deterrence. Thus an explicit bias pervades his discussions of these three areas; he tends to evaluate an action primarily in terms of the way it fits his own views. Moreover, although Gaddis has a grasp of the post-1945 period that allows him to convey the central ideas of the Truman Doctrine, the "New Look," flexible response and détente without becoming ensnared in the jargon of the professional strategists, Gray does not.

Gray's book is important since he serves on the General Advisory Committee of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; his views continue to

have an impact on the course of nuclear strategy. His denigration of the SALT talks here illuminates the Reagan administration's position on arms control. But as a history of American strategy, Gray's is meager fare when compared to the fullness of Gaddis's work. W.W.F.

BEYOND THE COLD WAR: A NEW APPROACH TO THE ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR ANNIHILATION. By *E. P. Thompson*. (New York: Pantheon, 1982. 198 pages, \$5.95, paper.)

Evaluating the nuclear disarmament movement is difficult; rhetoric blocks any clear conception of just what the movement is and what it wants (freeze? unilateral disarmament?). The European disarmament movements, which came to the fore long before the Americans were mobilized, are especially distant, since most American views of the peace groups are derived from three-minute newsclips of huge demonstrations or minimal coverage in the newspapers or newsmagazines.

All this means that the original ideas of the anti-nuclear movements should be studied. No better source than E. P. Thompson can be found for an introduction to the European movements' views. Intelligent, articulate and able to bridge the gap between didactic rhetoric and sterile prose, Thompson shows that the Europeans are not just concerned with chastising the West (and the United States in particular); they find no excuse for the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal either. In Thompson's collected essays, the demands for eliminating the SS-20's are voiced with the same intensity as the arguments against the Pershing 2's (but the fact that the disarmament movements have no leverage on the Soviet Union is not mentioned).

Moreover, Thompson sounds a deeper note in the disarmament campaign: a realization that the Balkanization of Europe must come to an end and that this end will not mean neutralism or appeasement with the Soviet Union but the dissolution of the two power blocs. No practical implementation of these goals for policymakers is offered, but the discussion of the movement's aims is nonetheless not lacking in ideas and possibly fresh approaches. W.W.F.

SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES: REQUIREMENTS AND RESPONSES. By *Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker*. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982. 171 pages, notes, appendices, tables and index, \$22.95, cloth; \$8.95, paper.)

Understanding the Soviet Union's strategic rationale in the deployment of its nuclear forces is based on a large amount of guesswork; Western strategists have had to draw their ideas from official Soviet writings and actions. Berman and Baker, who focus on the development of the Soviet Union's nuclear forces, follow a similar course, setting forth in some detail the history of the various Soviet intercontinental and intermediate-range ballistic missiles from their development at the "design bureaus" to their deployment in the various military regions of the Soviet Union. The book is a compilation of declassified United States government material and other published sources, including translated Soviet military writing. A brief explanation of the Soviet command structure and military doctrine and strategy at the beginning of the book sheds light on the highly centralized and very traditional nature of Soviet military policy, assessing its implications and effects on Soviet nuclear strategy. W.W.F.

THE NUCLEAR ERA: ITS HISTORY: ITS IMPLICATIONS. By Carl G. Jacobsen. (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunin and Hain, 1982. 142 pages, notes, addendum and index, \$20.00.)

This discussion of the history of the nuclear era by a historian and outstanding specialist on nuclear arms asks penetrating questions: "What drove the superpowers to a situation, a mere 35 years into the nuclear era, that saw each deploying more than 1000 times the explosive power of all the munitions fired in the Second World War?" Why are policy-makers engaged in a "dialogue of the deaf?" What is the influence of the American military-industrial complex, which Jacobsen terms a "beast with independent momentum and dynamism"?

Reviewing the history of the continuing arms race, he concludes that "none of the forces driving current arms proliferation trends (nuclear and conventional) can be seen in isolation. Most are intimately connected." Despite the difficulties in negotiating arms control, he warns, the world can no longer afford apathy and resignation, and he calls for "far more substantive efforts toward at least limited arms control." This brief study is one of the most informative and objective analyses of the very grave questions that confront the world today. O.E.S.

DEFENSE OR DELUSION? AMERICA'S MILITARY IN THE 1980'S. By Thomas H. Etzold. (New York, Harper and Row, 1982. 259 pages, notes and index, \$14.95.)

Etzold's book has not received the attention it deserves (possibly because it followed the publication of James Fallow's *National Defense*), which is unfor-

fortunate because Etzold covers in considerable detail the interaction of the military branches within the Defense Department on the questions of arms procurement and personnel and the need to maintain the prestige of each branch. W.W.F.

THE SOVIET ESTIMATE: U.S. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND RUSSIAN MILITARY STRENGTH. By John Prados. (New York: The Dial Press, 1982. 367 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$17.95.)

A competent history of the American intelligence community's various attempts and mistakes in assessing the military strength of the Soviet Union. The chapter on the "B-team," a politically appointed group of hardline Soviet experts who reassessed the Soviet Union's defense spending and buildup, is one of the few discussions of the group's impact on recent perceptions of Soviet power. W.W.F.

SCIENTISTS, THE ARMS RACE AND DISARMAMENT. Edited by Joseph Rotblat. (London: Taylor and Francis Limited, 1982. 323 pages, notes, appendices and index, \$24.95.)

Written by a group of scientists and scholars associated with nuclear weapons development, these essays deal with the various issues affecting the scientific community with regard to the arms race, technology's impact on the arms race, and the social responsibility of the scientist in the nuclear age. Particularly interesting are the essays by Herbert York and Bernard Feld. W.W.F.

THE DAY AFTER MIDNIGHT: THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR. Edited by Michael Riordan. (Palo Alto, Cal.: Cheshire Books, 1982. 143 pages, notes, photographs, glossary, maps and references, \$7.95.)

LONDON AFTER THE BOMB. By Owen Greene et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. 142 pages, notes, appendices and index, \$4.95, paper.)

The 1979 report from the United States Congress's Office of Technology Assessment has long been a favorite of the nuclear disarmament movement; here it has been repackaged. In its present format, *The Day After Midnight* offers in straightforward terms the consequences of both limited and massive nuclear war; the case study of "Charlottesville: 1984" and the analyses of nuclear attacks on Detroit and Leningrad bring out in stark detail the death and destruction that would result from a nuclear attack. The chapter on civil defense is a cogent and sober analysis, a needed antidote to the recent rhetoric about the issue.

For a British view of the effects of a nuclear attack, Owen Greene and his coauthors have drawn

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CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Arms Control Proposals

On November 18, 1981, in a speech to the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., President Ronald Reagan outlined his proposals for reducing nuclear arms—his so-called zero option for Europe and his proposal for START talks on strategic nuclear arms. On December 21, 1982, in a major speech, Soviet General Secretary Yuri Andropov outlined Soviet arms proposals and criticized the American “zero option.” In response to West European pressure, on March 29, 1983, President Reagan modified his “zero option,” offering an “interim proposal” to deploy fewer American intermediate-range missiles if the Soviet Union would reduce the number of Soviet warheads in Europe. Excerpts from the texts of these statements and an excerpt from a congressional resolution on a proposed nonbinding joint nuclear freeze (H.J. Res. 13) follow:

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ZERO OPTION, 1981

... I've just sent another message to the Soviet leadership. It's a simple, straightforward, yet historic message: The United States proposes the mutual reduction of conventional, intermediate-range nuclear and strategic forces. Specifically, I have proposed a four-point agenda to achieve this objective.

The first, and most important, point concerns the Geneva negotiations. As part of the 1979 two-track decision, NATO made a commitment to seek arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear forces. The United States has been preparing for these negotiations through close consultation with our NATO partners. We are now ready to set forth our proposal. I have informed [Soviet] President Brezhnev that when our delegation travels to the negotiations on intermediate-range land-based nuclear missiles in Geneva on the 30th of this month, my representatives will present the following proposal: The United States is prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground-launch cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. This would be an historic step. With Soviet agreement, we could together substantially reduce the dread threat of nuclear war which hangs over the people of Europe. This, like the first footstep on the moon, would be a giant step for mankind.

We intend to negotiate in good faith and go to Geneva willing to listen to and consider the proposals of our Soviet counterparts. But let me call to your attention the background against which our proposal is made. During the past 6 years, while the United States deployed no new intermediate-range missiles and withdrew 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe, the Soviet Union deployed 750 warheads on mobile, accurate ballistic missiles. They now have 1,100 warheads on the SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles, and the United States has no comparable missiles. Indeed, the United States dismantled the last such missile in Europe over 15 years ago.

As we look to the future of the negotiations, it is also important to address certain Soviet claims which, left unrefuted, could become critical barriers to real progress in arms control. The Soviets assert that a balance of intermediate-range nuclear forces already exists. That assertion is wrong. By any objective measure... the Soviet Union has an overwhelming advantage, on the order of six to one.

Soviet spokesmen have suggested that moving their SS-20s beyond the Ural Mountains will remove the threat to Europe. . . . the SS-20s, even if deployed behind the Urals, will have a range that places almost all of Western Europe, the great cities, Rome, Athens, Paris, London, Brussels, Amsterdam, Berlin, and so many more; all of Scandinavia; all of the Middle East; all of northern Africa—all within range of these missiles, which incidentally are mobile and can be moved on shorter notice.

The second proposal I've made to President Brezhnev concerns strategic weapons. The United States proposes to open negotiations on strategic arms as soon as possible next year.

Substance, however, is far more important than timing. As our proposal for the Geneva talks this month illustrates, we can make proposals for genuinely serious reductions but only if we take the time to prepare carefully. The United States has been preparing carefully for resumption of strategic arms negotiations because we do not want a repetition of past disappointments. We don't want an arms control process that sends hopes soaring only to end in dashed expectations.

I have informed President Brezhnev that we will seek to negotiate substantial reductions in nuclear arms which would result in levels that are equal and verifiable. Our approach to verification will be to emphasize openness and creativity—rather than the secrecy and suspicion which have undermined confidence in arms control in the past.

While we can hope to benefit from work done over the past decade in strategic arms negotiations, let us agree to do more than simply begin where these previous efforts left off. We can and should attempt major qualitative and quantitative progress. Only such progress can fulfill the hopes of our own people and the rest of the world. And let us see how far we can go in achieving truly substantial reductions in our strategic arsenals. To symbolize this fundamental change in direction, we will call these negotiations START—Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.

The third proposal I have made to the Soviet Union is that we act to achieve equality at lower levels of conventional forces in Europe. The defense needs of the Soviet Union hardly call for maintaining more combat divisions in East Germany today than were in the whole Allied invasion force that landed in Normandy on

D-day. The Soviet Union could make no more convincing contribution to peace in Europe—and in the world—than by agreeing to reduce its conventional forces significantly and constrain the potential for sudden aggression.

Finally, I have pointed out to President Brezhnev that to maintain peace, we must reduce the risks of surprise attack and the chance of war arising out of uncertainty or miscalculation. I am renewing our proposal for a conference to develop effective measures that would reduce these dangers. At the current Madrid meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, we are laying the foundation for a Western-proposed conference on disarmament in Europe. This conference would discuss new measures to enhance stability and security in Europe. Agreement on this conference is within reach. I urge the Soviet Union to join us and many other nations who are ready to launch this important enterprise.

All of these proposals are based on the same fair-minded principles: substantial, militarily significant reduction in forces; equal ceilings for similar types of forces; and adequate provisions for verification. My administration, our country, and I are committed to achieving arms reduction agreements based on these principles. Today, I have outlined the kinds of bold, equitable proposals which the world expects of us. But we cannot reduce arms unilaterally. Success can only come if the Soviet Union will share our commitment; if it will demonstrate that its often-repeated professions of concern for peace will be matched by positive action.

ANDROPOV'S REPLY, 1982

The war preparations of the United States and the NATO bloc which it leads have assumed an unprecedented, record scale. Official spokesmen in Washington are heard to discourse on the possibility of "limited," "sustained" and other varieties of nuclear war. This is intended to reassure people, to accustom them to the thought that such war is acceptable. Veritably, one has to be blind to the realities of our time not to see that wherever and however a nuclear whirlwind arises, it will inevitably go out of control and cause a worldwide catastrophe.

Our position on this issue is clear: a nuclear war—whether small or big, whether limited or total—must not be allowed to break out. No task is more important today than to stop the instigators of another war. This is required by the vital interests of all nations. That is why the unilateral commitment of the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons was received with approval and hope all over the world. If our example is followed by the other nuclear powers this will be a truly momentous contribution to the cause of preventing nuclear war.

It is argued that the West cannot take such a commitment because the Warsaw Treaty, allegedly, has an advantage in conventional armaments. To begin with, this is untrue, and the facts and figures bear witness to it. Furthermore, as everybody knows, we are in favor of limiting such armaments as well, and of searching for sensible, mutually acceptable solutions to this end. We are also prepared to agree that the sides should renounce first use of conventional, as well as nuclear arms.

Of course, one of the main avenues leading to a real scaling down of the threat of nuclear war is that of reaching a Soviet-American agreement on limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear arms. We approach ne-

gotiations on the matter with the utmost responsibility, and seek an honest agreement that will do no damage to either side and will at the same time lead to a reduction of the nuclear arsenals.

So far, unfortunately, we see a different approach on the part of the American side. While calling for "radical reductions" in words, what it really has in mind is essentially a reduction of the Soviet strategic potential. For itself, the United States would like to retain a free hand in building up strategic armaments. It is absurd even to think that we can agree to this. It would, of course, suit the Pentagon, but on no account can it be acceptable to the Soviet Union and, for that matter, to all those interested in preserving and consolidating peace.

Compare to this the proposals of the U.S.S.R. They are based on the principle of preserving parity. We are prepared to reduce our strategic arms by more than 25 per cent. U.S. arms, too, must be reduced accordingly, so that the two states have the same number of strategic delivery vehicles. We also propose that the number of nuclear warheads should be substantially lowered and that improvement of nuclear weapons should be maximally restricted.

Our proposals embrace all types of strategic weapons without exception, and envisage reduction of their stockpiles by many hundreds of units. They close all possible channels for any further arms race in this field. And that is only a start: the pertinent agreement would be the point of departure for a still larger mutual reduction of such weapons, which the sides could work out with reference to the general strategic situation in the world.

And while the negotiations are under way, we offer what is suggested by plain logic: to freeze the strategic arsenals of the two sides. The U.S. government does not want this, and now everyone can understand why: it has embarked on a new considerable build-up of nuclear armaments.

Washington's attempts to justify this build-up are obviously irrelevant. The talk about a "lag" behind the U.S.S.R. which the Americans must supposedly make good, is a deliberate untruth. This has been said more than once. And the argument that new weapon systems, such as the MX missile, are designed "to facilitate disarmament negotiations" is altogether absurd.

No programmes of a further arms build-up will ever force the Soviet Union to make unilateral concessions. We will be compelled to counter the challenge of the American side by deploying corresponding weapon systems of our own—an analogous missile to counter the MX missile, and our own long-range cruise missile, which we are now testing, to counter the U.S. long-range cruise missile.

We are also prepared to consider other pertinent proposals, including those made recently by the U.S. President. But the measures he referred to are not enough to dispel the atmosphere of mutual suspicion and to restore confidence. Something more is needed: to normalize the situation, and to renounce incitement of hostility and hatred, and propaganda of nuclear war. And, of course, the road to confidence, to preventing any and all wars including an accidental one, is that of stopping the arms race and going back to calm, respectful relations between states, back to détente.

We consider this important for all regions of the world, and especially for Europe, where a flare-up of any kind may trigger a worldwide explosion.

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

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Pershing 2's caused double consternation, however, because European deployment would allow them to strike Soviet silos and command centers with little or no warning. Real equivalency would presuppose Soviet SS-20 deployment in Cuba or Nicaragua. And one must caution against disregard of Brezhnev's 1982 warning. At that time he made it clear that a United States decision to violate the 20-year-old understanding that neither side deploy shorter-range missiles to firing locales from which they could strike the other's home territory would compel Moscow to proceed with "analagous" deployment.⁶

The subsequent Soviet warning that the Soviet Union might also have to embrace "launch-on-warning" concepts is perhaps less serious. It would constitute a drastic and uncharacteristically risky departure from past Soviet practice. But the suggestion did underline Soviet unease.

Andropov's proposal grasped for an alternative to the dangerous momentum that might otherwise unfold. The degree of his concession was startling. The need to balance American Forward Based Systems was shoved aside, exorcising a major problem of comparability. One presumes that Andropov argues that newer-generation Soviet aircraft stationed in European Russia, East Europe and perhaps Cuba will be adequate counters to FBS potential (although the latter still retains an edge in terms of technological sophistication and multipurpose capability). Still, Andropov has gone out on a limb, exposing himself to suggestions that he is offering too much and perhaps jeopardizing national security interests.

The initial NATO response orchestrated by Washington was starkly negative. As concerns strategic weaponry the Reagan administration did not waver; it continued to insist that bombers and cruise missiles (areas of marked American advantage) be excluded from consideration and that negotiations be restricted to ballistic missiles and, in particular, to land-based missiles (on which the Soviet Union remains disproportionately dependent). As concerns Euromissiles, Moscow's willingness to satisfy previous American demands was ignored, while the logic of Moscow's insistence on matching British and French arsenals was said to entail

a carte blanche for the Soviet Union to amass forces equal to the sum total of the forces of all its potential protagonists, including China.

Soviet spokesmen protested that Britain and France were members of an anti-Soviet alliance, that British and now also French missiles were explicitly targeted on Soviet cities (France has abandoned the Gaullist strategy of "ious azimuths," which dictated that French missiles be equally ready to respond to attack from all geographical directions), and that shorter and intermediate range missiles deployed against adjacent arsenals were in any case irrelevant to the intercontinental-range context of the superpower balance. As concerns a final Western objection, that surplus SS-20's moved east of the Urals could be moved back during a crisis, Moscow first noted that similar missiles stationed in the United States could be transported to European soil with equal ease and equal dispatch. Then the Soviet leaders went further: if the United States chose not to proceed with production, then dismantled SS-20's might actually be destroyed. The Soviet response elicited sympathy in Europe. Within a week, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's government in Britain modified its position; Andropov's initiative was said to be "significant."

Washington's posture needs to be addressed first, however. Reaganite assertions of actual or imminent Soviet superiority had oiled the congressional passage of dramatic defense budget increases, but it is doubtful whether they were ever more than a political tool. Certainly, when the administration took office, the most recent report to Congress of the Defense Department's chief scientist, W. J. Perry, confirmed that the United States remained superior in 12 of the 20 "most important areas of basic technology," and fully as capable as the Soviet Union in the remaining eight.⁷

Moscow does enjoy a crude quantitative lead in certain categories. But United States Defense Department documents testify to continuing American advantage in the more important areas. The United States possesses more warheads, both strategic and overall (60 percent of the world total). United States accuracy technologies remain superior and accuracy is far more important than megatonnage: a 50 percent improvement in accuracy has the same target effect as an eight-fold increase in yield. American warhead miniaturization technology (allowing more warheads on smaller missiles) also leads the field.

Finally, the United States retains a significant edge in terms of vulnerability: 70 percent of Moscow's strategic force conglomerate is land-based and hence theoretically vulnerable, as opposed to 21 percent of Washington's. And in terms of readiness: typically, well over 60 percent of United States strategic missile submarines are ready at their firing locales at any one time, compared to 14 percent of Moscow's.

The Defense Department's current five-year plan

⁶The 1962 understanding derived from the American withdrawal of missiles from Turkey shortly after Moscow dismantled its installations in Cuba, in 1962; the events were not contractually linked, but the timing suggested to most observers that an implicit agreement had been reached.

⁷W. J. Perry's statement in United States Senate, *Department of Defense Appropriations Fiscal Year 1980* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), part 4, p. 43; also see "Statistical Overview and Analysis," in D. R. Jones, ed., *Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual* (Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International, 1980), pp. 5-66.

TABLE 4: Theater Nuclear Missiles in or Transportable to Europe

		Year Deployed	Number Deployed	Warheads
U.S.S.R.	SS-20*	1976-1977	345	3
	SS-N-5	1963	30	1
Total			375	
U.S.**	Pershing 2	1983 (planned)	(108 projected)	
	GLCM	1983 (planned)	(464 projected)	
Total			(572 projected)	
U.K.	Trident 11D-5	1990's	(64 projected)	10
	Polaris A-3	1967	64	6
Total			64	
France	MSBS M-5	1985	(96 projected)	6
	SSBS S-3	1980	18	
	MSBS M-20	1977	80	
Total			98	

*This replaces 350 SS-4 and SS-5 missiles.

**The U.S. plans to begin deployment of these missiles in December, 1983.

states that ongoing programs are intended to "render the accumulated Soviet equipment stocks obsolescent." The administration's design is further revealed in its 1983 Defense Authorization Act. The most important element concerns the procurement of new super-carriers, core units of new, exceptionally potent naval squadrons. These are designed to go for the jugular and to strike directly at the heart of Soviet defenses, namely Moscow's second-strike and withholding sanctuary in the Barents Sea and adjacent Arctic waters.⁸ The Congressional Budget Office explains:

The specifics of these plans are based upon a maritime offensive strategy that emphasizes strikes against enemy waters and their supporting base structure, including strikes in enemy waters against its home territory. [The report continues] Critics of this position view the strategy as fundamentally unworkable, and likely to provoke Soviet use of nuclear weapons against the battle groups; [they consider the strategy to be] dangerously provocative in a nuclear-armed world and very hazardous to United States carrier forces even if a nuclear exchange is avoided.⁹

The past five United States administrations all based their defense policies on the thesis that Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) had become a fact of life and that it was likely to remain so for the foreseeable future, a judgment dictated by the nature of current and evolving technologies. Although Soviet forces lacked sophistication, it seemed clear that Moscow nevertheless had sufficient invulnerable strike potential to destroy United States society. This fact estab-

lished the precondition for arms negotiations. Both parties acknowledged that true superiority was impossible. It therefore made sense to try to stabilize the existing balance and to slow the escalatory momentum. This meant furthermore that each party had to desist from action that might jeopardize the other's retaliatory capacity, because of the scientific consensus that the ultimate ambition was futile and because it was realized that the very attempt would be provocative, destabilizing and dangerous.

The Reagan administration charted a new course. It asserted that Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) is avoidable, disregarding the fact that most experts continue to view the administration's position with skepticism; it claimed furthermore that arms agreements predicated on MAD (like SALT I and II) were unsatisfactory. President Reagan and his Defense Secretary, Caspar Weinberger, both supported the promulgation of nuclear utilization theories (NUTS). Their course stirred a barrage of criticism from many of the alumni of past National Security Councils, Republican as well as Democratic. Scientific consternation centered in part on the fact that the war-survival prognoses of the administration tended to be superficial, because they did not consider the full spectrum of immediate and short-term nuclear detonation effects and ignored longer-term consequences.¹⁰

The American search for military superiority is not immoral. Moscow would, of course, follow a similar course if it thought it could achieve superiority. But to chart a provocative course in the face of expert counsel that the sought-after holy grail is a mirage suggests ideology rather than reason. And this comment is equally applicable to the administration's second premise. Its apparently intrinsic faith in the achievability of the goal was reinforced by its stubborn conviction that Moscow's economic "mess" would preclude Soviet matching of a dramatically increased arms race ante. This conviction drew no support from history, nor

⁸See C. G. Jacobsen, "Soviet-American Policy: New Strategic Uncertainties," *Current History*, October, 1982.

⁹The CBO report, *Building a 600 Ship Navy: Cost, Timing and Alternative Approaches*, is available from the Congressional Budget Office, United States Congress, Washington, D.C.; also note the report and analysis in *The New York Times*, May 30, 1982.

¹⁰Raymond J. Graves, *The Effects of Nuclear War and the Myth of Survivability* (University of Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, May, 1982).

TABLE 5: Warsaw Pact and NATO Theater Nuclear Aircraft*

	Year Deployed	In Europe	Additional; Transportable to Europe	
U.S.S.R. primary long-range, land-based:				
Tu-22M Backfire	1974	60	15	
Su-24 Fencer	1974	375	125	
Tu-22 Blinder	1962	100	30	
Tu-16 Badger	1955	225	75	
U.S.S.R. primary long-range, naval:				
Tu-22M Backfire	1974	60	15	
Tu-22 Blinder	1962	35	15	
Tu-16 Badger	1955	190	60	
				TOTAL 1380
U.S.S.R. marginal long-range				
MIG-23/27 Flogger	1971	1500	500	
				TOTAL 2000
Rest of Warsaw Pact:		200		
				TOTAL 200
U.S. primary long-range, land based:				
FB-111 A	1969	0	63	
F-111 A/D/E/F	1967	156	144	
U.S. primary long-range, naval:				
F-18 Hornet	1982	[programmed: 1377]		
(replaces 200 Marine Corps F-4's and 360 A-7 Corsair II)				
A-6 Intruder	1963	20	230	
F-4 Phantom II	1961	0	200	
				TOTAL 2190
U.S. marginal long-range				
AV-8B Harrier II	1985	[projected: 322]		
F-16 Fighting Falcon	1979	**[programmed 1388]		
(replaces 1400 F-4 Phantom II)				TOTAL 1388
U.K. land-based:				
Harrier GR5 (AV-8B)	1986	[projected: 60]		
Tornado GR.1 (IDS)	1982	[programmed: 220]		
(replaces 55 Vulcan B.2)				
Jaguar GR.1	1973	140		
Buccaneer S.2	1962	60		
U.K. naval:				
Buccaneer S.2	1962	20		
				TOTAL 440
France land-based				
Mirage 2000N	1986	[projected: 200]		
Jaguar A	1973	160		
Mirage IVA	1964	35		
Mirage 111E	1961	135 (to be phased out)		
France naval				
Super Etandard	1979	60		
				TOTAL 390
West German land-based				
Tornado 1D5	1982	[programmed: 212]		
West German naval:				
Tornado 1D5	1982	[programmed: 112]		
(replaces 95 F-104 G Starfighters)				
				TOTAL 324
Rest of NATO				
Tornado IDS	1982	[programmed: 100]		
F-16 Fighting Falcon	1979	[programmed: 230]		
(replaces 555 F/CF-104G Starfighters)				
F-104S (Aeritalia)	1969	196		
A-7H/P Corsair II	1966	63		
F-4E Phantom II	1961	134		
				TOTAL 723
Non-U.S. NATO				TOTAL 1877

*“Primary long-range” and “marginal long-range” with a radius of 900 to 5500 kilometers (intercontinental-range).

**Reserve Force: 1400 F-4's plus 370 A-7's, totaling 1770.

from any of the more respected American Soviet specialists, whether from academia or from the Central Intelligence Agency.

In the spring of 1983, Moscow was able, in theory, to threaten the United States land-based missiles, as Washington had long threatened Moscow's, although for a variety of reasons the theoretical accuracies required for "counterforce" targeting were likely to prove ephemeral in a real-war setting. But Moscow had no ongoing program that threatened the core of the United States retaliatory capabilities. Washington, however, did have a program that purported to threaten Moscow's.

On the other hand, Congress, affected both by the criticisms of the professional community and by the nuclear freeze votes of November, 1982, was pressuring the White House to return to the concept of MAD and to more substantive negotiations. And herein lay the crux. Andropov's initiatives had placed the ball in Washington's court. The longer-term Washington response awaited the outcome of unfolding policy dynamics; the outcome will determine whether we will have a meaningful arms agreement or whether "the second cold war" will turn chillier and more dangerous.

Finally, one must note the increasing Allied hesitancy to follow President Reagan's lead. The hesitancy was mirrored in the backtracking of the Thatcher government in Britain, the European government whose philosophical bent most closely approximates President Reagan's. It was also mirrored in the unprecedented suggestion in Britain's respected *Guardian* in 1982, that the time might have come when Britain should consider leaving NATO.¹¹

NATO solidarity has always rested on the assumption that it was a defensive alliance. Fear that Washington has switched into offensive gear in pursuit of unilateral ambitions is sapping cohesion and undermining support. The European nuclear disarmament movement, nurtured by the spreading belief that Washington's course is ill-advised and possibly dangerous, is transforming NATO politics. Europe's reaction could in the long term prove more detrimental to the United States position in the world than the issue of Soviet armed might. This may well be the strongest argument for greater American flexibility. Arms control aspirations, and more, depend on American receptivity to this argument. ■

¹¹"Time to Abandon the Alliance?" *The Guardian Weekly*, August 29, 1982.

BOOK REVIEWS

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on official government contingency plans to show the magnitude of damage and the plethora of problems associated with existence after an attack on London and its environs. W.W.F.

INDEFENSIBLE WEAPONS: THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CASE AGAINST NUCLEARISM. By Robert Jay Lifton and Richard Falk. (New York: Basic Books, 1982. 301 pages, notes and index, \$6.95.)

Lifton, a psychologist at Yale, and Falk, a professor of international law at Princeton, have split the task of exploring what they call the newest "ism." Lifton's contribution soberly discusses the philosophical, psychological and linguistic implications of nuclear weapons on our culture, while Falk summarizes the history of nuclear weapons strategy, including a statement that the United States offered nuclear weapons to the French in Indochina in 1954. (In actual fact, this offer was considered but never made; see *The New York Times*, August 23, 1982.) Decidedly anti-nuclear in intent, the book is an interesting albeit somewhat detached approach to the issue of nuclear war. W.W.F.

ALSO ON ARMS

ARMS TRANSFERS UNDER NIXON. By Lewis Sorley. (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1983. 231 pages, notes, appendices, bibliography and index, \$22.00.)

THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF ARMS SALES. By Andrew J. Pierre. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982. 352 pages, notes, index, \$6.95 paper.)

THE MILITARY DRAFT. Edited by Martin Anderson. (Stanford: Hoover Press, 1982. 668 pages, index and tables, n.p.)

MILITARY DECEPTION AND STRATEGIC SURPRISE. Edited by John Gooch and Amos Perlmutter. (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1982. 192 pages, notes, and tables, \$30.00.)

WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES, 1982. By Ruth Leger Sivard. (Leesburg, Va.: World Priorities, 1982. 44 pages, notes, graphs, tables and maps, \$4.00.)

MISCELLANEOUS

ATLAS OF THE 20TH CENTURY. (New York: Facts on File Publications, 1982. 256 pages, photos, maps and index, \$29.95.)

Richard Natkiel, head of the cartographic department of *The Economist* (London), has prepared over 200 maps of the more decisive battles and campaigns of the last 80 years. Starting with the Boer War and including the Falklands war (1982), the book details territorial changes throughout the world. Succinct summaries accompany each map. Although there is a preponderance of maps on World War II, the atlas is an informative journey into changes in the world. W.W.F. ■

ADVANCING TECHNOLOGY

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solutions to military problems. For example, nuclear-armed missiles deployed on submarines are less destabilizing than ground-based ICBM's, since they are less vulnerable to nuclear attack.

Of perhaps greater consequence, new technology has made major contributions to adequate verification, one of the vexing problems for stable arms control agreements. Sensitive seismometers and a better scientific understanding of seismic wave propagation have greatly improved capabilities to detect and identify underground nuclear explosions at long distances. Earth-orbiting satellites carrying photo reconnaissance and other equipment permit nonobtrusive monitoring of other nations by what, in treaty language, is called "national technical means." These procedures have been of great importance in monitoring the provisions of the SALT I and SALT II agreements and are formally referenced in the 1972 ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) treaty between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

New military technologies will doubtless continue to be unsettling to world peace and security, but the positive contributions of other technologies will probably also continue. The principal barriers to substantive arms control and disarmament will almost surely be the limitations of political will and vision. Indeed, the best hope for obtaining measures of arms control lies in increased political concern and political pressure.

Two recent examples demonstrate the political importance of citizen pressure. One example is the wave of anti-nuclear demonstrations in West Europe, notably in England, West Germany and the Netherlands. These clearly hastened President Reagan's decision to enter into arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union; and the political pressure on West European governments and indirectly on the United States continues. Comparable political pressure has developed in the United States in support of a negotiated bilateral freeze on nuclear weapons production and deployment in the United States and the Soviet Union. Several types of nuclear freeze have been suggested, and their potential acceptability and negotiability varies, but their message is clear: stop the nuclear arms buildup. The fact that in the fall of 1982 a nuclear freeze referendum was on the ballot in 8 states and several major cities—including one-fourth of the United States population—is a political event of considerable importance. Of the 18 million citizens who voted on this issue, 60 percent favored the freeze.

Other political pressures are also building in favor of arms control. The high and increasing cost of United States military programs is one; the cutting of appropriations for a variety of civilian-oriented programs as military expenditures increase is another. The increased recognition that United States civilian

technologies are declining relative to those of other developed nations also suggests the need for a change in emphasis. Many of these same pressures are developing in the Soviet Union and so is increased recognition of the devastating impact of nuclear war. Hence there are modest reasons to hope that serious arms control and disarmament will be seen as mutually beneficial, and that serious and successful arms control negotiations will result. ■

SOVIET-AMERICAN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

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objectives included mutual but necessarily unequal reductions to equal levels of arms and enhanced security stemming from restraints directed at the most threatening categories of nuclear weapons.

To strengthen deterrence at lower levels of arms, the administration offered a proposal for a two-stage negotiation, calling in the first instance for cuts in all ballistic missiles (ICBM's and SLBM's) to an equal level approximately one-half the current United States number of about 1,700 (as compared to roughly 2,350 for Moscow). The total number of warheads on those missiles would be cut by at least one-third, to about 5,000 from the roughly 7,500 now deployed by each side. No more than half those warheads would be permitted atop land-based ICBM's, which by virtue of their size and accuracy pose the greatest threat to other land-based systems and so to strategic stability. This sublimit would require the Soviet Union to slash by half the number of its presently deployed ICBM warheads while allowing the United States to increase its ICBM warheads slightly. The United States proposal would apparently call for special reductions in the heaviest Soviet missile, the SS-18, and would freeze bombers at current levels (about 400 for the United States and 350 for the Soviet Union, including the Backfire). Cruise missiles would be unregulated.

In phase two of the negotiations, the United States would seek equal ceilings on missile throw-weight at a level below current United States throw-weight of 4 million pounds (versus Soviet missile throw-weight in excess of 11 million pounds). At this stage, the United States would be prepared to discuss bomber reductions and cruise missile limits.

Soviet negotiators have thus far rejected the United States proposal on the grounds that it exploits the "structural differences" between United States and Soviet nuclear forces, in view of the fact that the Soviet Union deploys 75 percent of its warheads on ICBM's, the United States, only 25 percent. But those weapons are the most destabilizing, and it is apparently the United States intent to persuade Moscow to shift more of its nuclear forces to sea, where smaller and less accurate missiles still pose less of a threat to the other side's land-based forces. Since SLBM submarines are

relatively less vulnerable, moreover, strategic stability would be enhanced, because each side could avoid a hair-trigger response to a crisis, including a possibly false warning of an attack. The Soviet Union countered with a proposal for a freeze on the number of deployed weapons during the START talks and the modernization of existing systems, thereby blocking imminent deployment of cruise missiles and possibly blocking the MX, the new Trident II SLBM and the B-1 bomber. Moscow subsequently suggested a START accord imposing an equal ceiling of 1,800 SNDV's (the number proposed five years earlier by Vance and rejected), barring deployment of new intermediate-range missiles in Europe, and setting additional strict limits on all other cruise missiles. Moreover, Moscow suggested adoption of "the best elements" of the SALT II Treaty.

The Soviet proposal underscored the connection between the START talks and the negotiations (also in Geneva) on limiting intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). The INF talks began in November, 1981, as a result of a two-track NATO decision in December, 1979, to modernize its INF while seeking an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. To offset Soviet deployment of triple-warhead SS-20 IRBM's (intermediate-range ballistic missiles) able to strike any city in West Europe, NATO agreed to deploy 108 Pershing 2 missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM's) capable of reaching Soviet territory. The NATO deployments, prompted by an initiative advanced by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, are designed to deter Soviet military pressure on West Europe by bringing targets on Soviet territory within range of NATO weapons.

The Soviet Union currently deploys 340 SS-20's, 250 of which are stationed west of the Urals.⁷ The 90 east of the Urals may be transported, however, in a few days to launch points against West Europe. Added to the 260 single-warhead SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, the SS-20 force gives Moscow a first-strike force against European targets of 1,300 warheads. NATO presently has no comparable missiles deployed, and its nuclear-armed aircraft, posing only a modest first-strike threat, are vastly outnumbered by corresponding Warsaw Pact aircraft. Even with the inclusion of British and French nuclear forces (the latter not under NATO command), the Warsaw Pact enjoys a 3 to 1 advantage in both delivery vehicles and warheads.

To forestall the NATO deployments, Soviet General Secretary Yuri Andropov has proposed that in return for NATO's agreement not to deploy the planned 572 new missiles the Soviet Union would reduce its force of SS-20's in Europe to 162, the number of British and French missiles. Andropov's gambit, it was later revealed, meant only that the affected SS-20's would

be redeployed east of the Urals, from where they could still hit targets in West Europe, not to mention United States friends and allies in Asia. Even before this clarification, the United States, Britain and France separately rejected the offer. French President François Mitterrand was particularly emphatic in stressing the threat posed by Soviet SS-20's, and his Socialist party's national secretary for international affairs characterized as "total impudence" the warning by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko that NATO deployments of Pershing 2 and ground launched cruise missiles would increase the chance of war.

THE ZERO OPTION

The American proposal, introduced in November, 1981, as the "zero option," asked Moscow to dismantle all its 340 SS-20's and 260 SS-4's and SS-5's in return for which NATO would forgo deployment of all 572 Pershing 2's and ground launched cruise missiles. Although under growing pressure to modify its proposal, especially from a deeply divided West Germany, the Reagan administration held to the zero option in advance of the West German parliamentary elections March 6. But hints of possible flexibility showed through when it was revealed that United States INF negotiator Paul Nitze had reached an informal agreement with his Soviet counterpart, Yuli Kvitsinsky, the previous summer that called for, among other things, a reduction to 75 SS-20's aimed at Europe together with a freeze at 90 SS-20's in Asia. NATO, for its part, would deploy only 75 GLCM's (with 4 warheads apiece) and no Pershing 2's, whose 6-minute flight time to Soviet targets made Moscow nervous.

Although the Soviet Union repudiated its negotiator and although the plan was never cleared with United States allies as required by protocol and precedent, press reports of a similar rejection by the United States government may have been exaggerated. Whether agreement can be reached before the initial NATO deployments are scheduled to begin at year's end is uncertain. Demonstrating the military linkage between the START and INF talks, Moscow may be unwilling to make an INF deal until it knows the broad contours of a START accord, because the total threat to Soviet territory cannot otherwise be estimated. For the United States, the two negotiations are linked politically. A START accord without an INF deal might encourage West Europeans to believe that Washington was prepared to export the arms race to Europe. But the imminence of NATO deployments may drive the parties to an INF agreement in advance of START.

The timetable may also be affected by the spreading activity of the American and West European nuclear freeze movements. In West Germany, in particular, widespread demonstrations in opposition to any NATO modernization plans may gather strength.

⁷"Moscow Indicates Easing of Stance on Cuts in Missiles," *The New York Times*, December 12, 1982.

Similar movements elsewhere in West Europe may weaken the resolve of NATO governments, leading to no NATO deployments and no Soviet reductions—the least advantageous outcome possible from the standpoint of the European balance of intermediate nuclear forces.

The American nuclear freeze movement is less likely to be as influential. Advocating a verifiable, bilateral freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons (an issue that carried by 3 to 1 margins in a series of state and local referendums last fall), the United States freeze movement was based on an impossible objective. In effect, it would require Soviet agreement to allow foreign on-site inspectors to roam at will through every military production factory in a country where access by members of the Soviet Communist party to the newspaper of the French Communist party is considered a threat to national security.

Even if the nuclear freeze were somehow verifiable, it would diminish international security and crisis stability. Applied to Europe, a United States-Soviet freeze would codify a glaring inequality in intermediate-range nuclear forces. This in turn would weaken the security connection between the United States and West Europe, a development to which the American nuclear freeze movement is indifferent.

At the strategic nuclear level, a United States-Soviet freeze would weaken pressure for actual reductions in the most destabilizing American and Soviet weapons systems. But because the Soviet Union deploys more of the most threatening systems, weakening pressure for Soviet arms reduction would be especially dangerous to world security. Despite rigorous criticism of the United States negotiating positions at the START and INF talks, international stability is more likely to be advanced by sensible compromises than by ill-advised public initiatives that have the effect of disarming American negotiators. ■

RUSSIAN TRADITION AND SOVIET MILITARY POLICY

(Continued from page 200)

Soviet thinkers see no grounds for believing that if nuclear weapons are used at all, they will be employed only in a limited manner. Therefore they have long argued that a nuclear war will inevitably be a global catastrophe.

The tension between the ideological imperative that makes mandatory the recognition of the possibility of war and hence a need to be prepared to wage it, and the common-sense realization that nuclear war is too destructive to be a rational tool of politics, remained officially unresolved until April 21, 1981. Then Konstantin Chernenko once and for all exempted nuclear

conflicts from the cloak of rationality implied by Clausewitz's dictum. In so doing, he implicitly recognized that, in any calculation of the correlation of strategic forces between East and West, the age-old goal of guaranteeing the security of the Russian (Soviet) heartland would remain seriously in doubt in the event of a nuclear war. This recognition suggests that the Soviet leaders' renunciation of "first use" is more than pure propaganda or a smug recognition of their own allegedly overwhelming conventional superiority.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union's political and military leadership has little ground—especially in light of many of the recent reports coming out of Washington—for feeling that their opponents have a similarly sane view of a nuclear exchange. Given the Soviet Union's deep-rooted paranoia and lively sense of vulnerabilities, this doubt about its opponent's sanity ensures that Soviet defense and national security will remain a matter of first priority.

It is this attitude that explains the Soviet Union's powerful ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) force and recent deployment of 345 SS-20 IRBM's (intermediate-range ballistic missiles). According to President Reagan and his supporters, these buildups have placed the United States at a distinct strategic disadvantage. So Americans must tighten their belts to finance the deployment—in some manner or other—of the new MX (missile experimental) "Peacekeeper" ICBM at home; and Europeans must swallow their fears as 572 Tomahawk cruise and Pershing 2 IRBM's are introduced into their midst. Only in this manner, argues the administration in Washington, can the United States avoid the danger that the ground-based leg of its triad of strategic systems might be destroyed by a first strike of the powerful and allegedly accurate SS-18 heavy ICBM's or that the Soviet Union would successfully strike at West Europe with SS-20's, while Soviet strategic forces remained intact to threaten retaliation if the Americans hit back with their strategic systems, the only forces available to them. If either or both these alternatives become reality the result would be disastrous. Even so, the question remains, is either likely in the first place? Consideration of past Russian practice indicates that some basic assumptions behind these alternatives are questionable.

In the first place, defenders of the Reagan administration's position argue that the "unprecedented" Soviet strategic buildup of the 1960's–1970's was motivated by a desire to gain "strategic superiority" over the United States. In making this claim, they downplay the fact that for a long time the Soviet Union itself languished in a position of strategic "inferiority." And if American planners, secure in their knowledge that they had no intention of using their own superiority aggressively, could dismiss Soviet fears to the contrary, they could hardly expect Moscow's planners to do the same.

Indeed, they did not. As on many other occasions in Russia's past, the government and Ministry of Defense instituted crash programs to overcome the technological gap. After all, like their Imperial predecessors (during the 1860's-1870's for example), they had no intention of seeing their nation slip from its position as a Great Power.

Significantly, once the Soviet leadership felt that the Soviet Union was achieving "rough parity" with the United States, it began to show a serious interest in arms control. This was, of course, a major factor in the successful SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) negotiations of the 1970's. It is especially striking that in spite of the Soviet military's traditional and ingrained respect for massive numbers (as evidenced in Soviet manpower levels and in huge Soviet stockpiles of tanks and artillery), the political leadership nonetheless agreed to put ceilings on Soviet holdings of strategic launchers. If nothing else, such uncharacteristic behavior was another indication of the seriousness with which the Soviet leadership regards the possibility of a nuclear conflict.

DISAGREEMENT OVER MOTIVES

Second, of late Washington has been rejecting the Soviet view of an existing "rough parity" as a mere ruse behind which the Soviet Union plans to continue the drive for nuclear superiority, or even prepares to launch a disarming first strike. However, Moscow disagrees. There are many uncertainties as to the reliability of all nuclear missile systems. These are hardly likely to convince the conservative Soviet military planners that any "correlation of forces" will allow them to decapitate the Americans' land-based ICBM's with the ease and lack of risk suggested by so many Western military planners. Instead, such American statements are more likely to convince Soviet leaders that Washington's talk of inferiority, taken with its deployment of the MX, is the American cover for acquiring its own first strike capability.

This would place the Soviet Union in an even less enviable position than Reagan administration supporters believe the Americans now face. For Russian planners can never forget that they lack the balanced mix of ICBM's, SLBM's and bombers found in the United States strategic "triad." Instead, some 70 percent of the Soviet warheads remain on more vulnerable land-based ICBM's, a fact that explains the recent Soviet refusal to discuss reductions in land-based systems alone at Geneva. The alleged reliability of existing Soviet strategic systems is also open to serious question. Recently leaked data from the American intelligence community apparently supports the view that Soviet missiles are far less accurate or reliable than the assessments behind American first-strike assumptions. Soviet military planners themselves must have long been aware of this. Further, taken with the traditional

Soviet preference for "big" weapons, this lack of accuracy probably explains the large throw-weight of the SS-18 "heavy" ICBM.

All in all, the case for a significant Soviet strategic edge is weak, and American claims that the Kremlin believes it has an edge are even less well founded. In fact, considering the lags in Soviet technology and the traditional Russian feelings of technological inferiority, the claim of "rough parity" may well be false. In the past, both Russian and Soviet leaders have disguised an uneasy awareness of their military's own shortcomings by strident claims of equality or superiority. Whether or not this reflection is appropriate today remains to be seen.

A third consideration suggests that the American assumption about Soviet targeting policy suffers from a peculiar, not to say perverse, form of "ethnocentrism." In many first-strike premises put forward in Washington, the United States is treated egotistically as the primary if not the only victim of a Soviet strike. True, this reflects the reality of American power, but it ignores the traditional Russian and Soviet paranoia about encirclement. In fact, apart from United States bases beyond American borders, the Soviet Union is encircled by potentially hostile nuclear powers. In the east there is China, whose nuclear missile force is still minute, but growing. And in Europe, in addition to NATO's (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) tactical systems, there are the strategic nuclear forces of France and Great Britain.

Soviet planners, then, have a much broader range of targets than their Western counterparts; the United States is not the only nation targeted by the strategic Soviet systems. American targets outside the United States, and British and French installations as well, would probably be included in any first strike. But Soviet leaders still could not guarantee that a surgical first strike would not result in a holocaust that would bring a vengeful and massive retaliation on the Soviet homeland from the surviving American nuclear forces. For this reason, the cautious men of the Kremlin could be expected to embrace such a course only in a moment of utter desperation.

The same geographical factor applies to Soviet motives for deploying the SS-20 IRBM's. Although Moscow accepted a one-on-one relationship to the United States for the purpose of the SALT negotiations, it is unlikely that Soviet leaders overlooked existing French, British and Chinese systems: If the Soviet Union were to accept equality with the United States in intercontinental systems, they had to develop intermediate systems to deal with threats that were closer to home. One development may have been the Backfire bomber; another was the mobile SS-20. Not only did the SS-20 lack the vulnerability of static, silo-based systems, but it could be redeployed easily to meet changes in the levels of threat from either east or west.

In any case, its role as a counter to British and French arsenals explains why for the first time Soviet negotiators at Geneva have seriously attempted to link the reduction of theater weapons to discussions on further cuts and controls in the strategic field. As a result, future calculations of balance must almost inevitably include non-American weapons.

In view of Russia's past experience and present position, no other course would make sense to Soviet General Secretary Yuri Andropov and his colleagues. Yet their mere possession of nuclear weapons does not necessarily make them more likely to use them than Western powers are to use theirs. A comparison of statements like Chernenko's with the Reagan administration's reported plans for waging a "prolonged nuclear conflict" may lead many non-Americans to be somewhat more sympathetic to Moscow's worries than to Washington's intentions. This aside, it is clear that the Kremlin will retain its arsenal at a level that will convince its enemies that the Soviet Union, if attacked, can survive, retaliate and continue to fight. Nonetheless, Soviet leaders see this policy as having no special aggressive intent. Rather, they view it as the only credible deterrent with which to guard the Socialist Motherland from a horrendous replay of the disasters of 1941.

In conclusion, then, Western observers will do well to remember that the Soviet military establishment's patterns of thought, like its institutions, social forms and tactical precepts, have been conditioned as much by Russia's past as by Marxism-Leninism. Seen in this context, many aspects of Soviet doctrine and practice may appear less new and somewhat less alarming. If it accepted this premise, the West might deal more effectively with the actual rather than imagined or exaggerated realities of Soviet military power. Simultaneously, Western leaders might avoid steps that will only increase the Soviet leadership's traditional insecurities.

In any case, one fact is clear. Those who insist on ignoring the lessons of Russian history as seen by the Russians themselves will only misunderstand—perhaps fatally—both the generalities and the details of that nation's current military problems and policies. ■

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY

(Continued from page 196)

tion has embarked on an ambitious and broad program of strategic nuclear force modernization. All three legs of the triad have been addressed: 1) the land-based forces, through further work on MX development (now called the Peacekeeper), study of various basing modes for it, and completion of the retrofitting of Minuteman III missiles with MK-12A warheads; 2) the sea-based forces, through the launch-

ing of the first Ohio-class submarines each with 24 Trident C-4 SLBM's (submarine-launched ballistic missiles), the further development of follow-on D-5 SLBM's, and the deployment of nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM's) on attack submarines, reactivated battleships and other surface vessels; and 3) the strategic bomber force, through an expansion of the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) program, further development of the B-1 bomber and the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB) incorporating "stealth" technology. Major emphasis has been placed on hardening and diversifying C³ (command, control and communications) links to increase their survivability. The air defense of North America, research and development on possible ballistic missile defense (BMD) technology, and civil defense efforts have also received increased attention.

In sum, then, the administration's nuclear procurement policies (level one) represent an incremental extension of previous policies, not a radical departure. Some programs have been accelerated, some numerical goals have grown, and costs have risen; but the basic parameters of the strategic modernization effort always have been defined more by what is and is not technologically possible than by the desires of any single administration. With the long lead times for major new weapons programs, often extending over a decade from inception to operation, the deployments of one administration reflect the decisions of as many as two or three of its predecessors. This provides an element of continuity in United States strategic programs and suggests that the impact of this administration will be realized incrementally for years to come.

In addition to public anxieties about nuclear weapons and some loose talk by members of the administration, a third factor is undermining political support for its strategic nuclear policies: the worsening of Soviet-American relations and the lack of progress in arms control negotiations. When Soviet-American relations are characterized by nasty rhetoric on both sides and by relatively few official contacts, people begin to worry about what could happen in a crisis. Without open channels of communication between top leaders in the Kremlin and the White House, the chances for war through accident or misunderstanding appear to grow dangerously fast.

Throughout the postwar period, the Western approach to security has rested on parallel efforts to arm while talking with political adversaries about disarming. In democracies, it is politically unpopular either to talk too bluntly about nuclear Armageddon or to appear to be too eager to arm without a serious effort to limit armaments. It was not by accident that in 1979 the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) countries decided on a two-track approach to intermediate nuclear forces: the development of the Pershing 2 and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM's)

while Soviet-American negotiations continue; and deployment of the new systems if the talks prove inconclusive.

Throughout the 1970's, arms control and the arms competition proceeded hand in hand, each justified on the basis of the existence of the other. The symbiotic relationship may not have resulted in greater security for either side and may not have affected the United States and the Soviet Union in the same way, but the relationship was viable politically. The Reagan administration, in its haste to find fault with its predecessors, overlooked this linkage. It initially rejected the arms control process as unproductive and even harmful to United States interests, while expressing its determination to arm first and to negotiate later.

Fairly or unfairly, the Reagan administration has been widely perceived as being more interested in arming than in disarming. It is hard to see how this could have been otherwise, given the administration's oft-repeated underlying assumption that the Soviet Union has achieved superiority in the most crucial dimensions of strategic nuclear weaponry in addition to its long-held advantages in conventional and theater nuclear forces. The administration has begun to recognize these dilemmas and to play down the talk about Soviet superiority. After all, it can now claim to have reversed the long-time disadvantageous trends in the military balance and thus to have set the stage for real arms reductions on both sides. The President has repeatedly underlined his deep commitment to arms reductions, though this has yet to be reflected by much flexibility at the negotiating tables.

In recent months, the administration has shown greater discipline in its statements about nuclear issues, in part because George P. Shultz, the new Secretary of State, is a far more cautious man than his predecessor, and because Secretary of Defense Weinberger has learned from his sometimes bitter experiences of the first two years. Having tested public sentiment in the 1982 election, Congress is reasserting control over the defense budget and certainly will make substantial cuts in the fiscal 1984 requests. As it enters the second half of its first term, the Reagan administration will thus face some tough decisions regarding strategic nuclear programs. There is reason to believe that historians looking back at the 1981-1985 period will conclude that, after a rough beginning, in the second half of its first term the nuclear policies of the Reagan administration settled into a pattern largely resembling the patterns of its predecessors. ■

SOVIET-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AT THE END OF AN ERA

(Continued from page 209)

1983, to try to undercut the Soviet attraction.

The public dimension of differentiated détente and the "peace offensive" has been especially evident in

Soviet proposals for nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. The concept of nuclear-free zones, or "zones of peace" has long been an integral part of Soviet arms control efforts in the United Nations.¹⁹

In the wake of the NATO decision of December, 1979, to deploy American missiles in West Europe, Soviet advocacy of a nuclear-free zone for northern Europe once again came to the fore. But a statement made by President Brezhnev during a June interview with a Finnish newspaper added a significant new element, albeit a rather ambiguous one:

... this proposal does not preclude the possibility of considering other measures applying to our own territory in the region adjoining the nuclear-free zone in the north of Europe.²⁰

The Soviet government had previously been unwilling to consider any nuclear-free zone that would include contiguous Soviet territory. Over the years, most Scandinavian government officials saw this as evidence of the propagandizing intentions of Soviet proposals; particularly since the Scandinavians were already nuclear free and since they viewed some Soviet nuclear deployments on the Kola Peninsula and in the Baltic to be threatening to their national security.²¹ The embarrassing incident in October, 1981, of a Soviet submarine running aground on the Swedish coast certainly did little to help the Soviet "peace offensive" with respect to the Scandinavian countries.²²

In addition to suggestions for a nuclear-free zone in the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Union has also favored a nuclear-free zone for the Mediterranean. The most recent Soviet proposal on this issue was made by Brezhnev during a visit to Moscow by Algerian President Chadli Benjedid in June, 1981. As part of the proposal to transform the Mediterranean "into a zone of stable peace and cooperation," Brezhnev argued that all ships carrying nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from the Mediterranean and that the nuclear powers should commit themselves not to use their nuclear weapons "against any Mediterranean country that does not permit the deployment of such weapons on its territory."

The Balkans comprise another region where the Soviet leadership has advocated the creation of a nu-

¹⁹For Soviet sources presenting general and historical overviews of the Soviet position on nuclear-free zones, see V. Davidov, "Non-Nuclear Zones, An Important Factor in International Affairs," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnaya otnocheniya*, no. 12, 1981, pp. 30-41; J. Shchyolokova, "Nuclear-Free Zones, Goal and Content," *International Affairs* (Moscow), no. 11, 1981, pp. 104-110.

²⁰*Pravda*, June 27, 1981.

²¹See Robert K. German, "Nuclear-Free Zones: Norwegian Interest, Soviet Encouragement," *Orbis*, summer, 1982, pp. 451-476.

²²Milton Leitenberg, "The Stranded USSR Submarine in Sweden and the Question of a Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone," *Cooperation and Conflict*, no. 17, 1982, pp. 17-28.

clear-free zone. The Soviet Union consistently spoke out in favor of this idea when it was presented by Romania in the United Nations. Following talks between Bulgarian President Todor Zhivkov and Brezhnev in August, 1981, a communiqué was issued calling for the establishment of such a zone for the entire Balkan region.

This record of interaction between American and Soviet public diplomacy during the past two years suggests the strain in superpower relations. The central thrust of Soviet diplomacy has been in Europe, in particular with regard to the INF negotiations and NATO's plans to deploy Pershing 2's and GLCM's. It is in Europe that the Kremlin's strategy of differentiated détente is most clearly revealed. Moscow has continued to negotiate with the United States but may have little expectation that an acceptable agreement will be reached. In any case, it has hedged its bets by negotiating vigorously with Washington's West European allies and by mounting a strong propaganda effort to win popular support in West Europe.

The START talks have clearly had lower priority in Moscow, although the proposals advanced in the summer of 1982 were made with an eye toward the larger campaign of public diplomacy. Soviet leaders continue to use strategic arms negotiations as a means of protecting their own strategic assets and of managing the character of United States programs. Depending on the outcome of INF negotiations, the Soviet Union may reevaluate its START position. For example, Soviet leaders have carefully referred to cruise missiles in their public discussions of both INF and START. Should INF not produce the desired agreement, the Soviet Union might well attempt to negotiate controls over this new technology in START. ■

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

(Continued from page 223)

The Soviet Union is prepared to go very far. As everybody knows, we have suggested an agreement renouncing all types of nuclear weapons—both medium-range and tactical—designed to strike at targets in Europe.

We have also suggested another variant: that the U.S.S.R. and the NATO countries reduce their medium-range weaponry by more than two thirds. So far, the United States will not agree to that. For its part, it has submitted a proposal which, as if in mockery, is called a "zero option." It envisages elimination of all Soviet medium-range missiles not only in the European but also in the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union, while NATO's nuclear-missile arsenal in Europe is to remain intact and may even be increased. Does anyone really think that the Soviet Union can agree to this? It appears that Washington is out to block an agreement and, on the pretext that the talks have collapsed, to station its missiles on European soil.

The future will show if this is so. We, for our part, will continue to work for an agreement on a basis that is fair to both sides. We are prepared, among other things, to agree that the Soviet Union should retain in Europe only as many missiles as Britain and France have

there—and not a single one more. This means that the Soviet Union would reduce its missiles by hundreds of units, including tens of the latest missiles known in the West as SS-20. As regards both Soviet and American medium-range missiles, this would be a really honest "zero" option. And if, later, the number of British and French missiles were scaled down, the number of Soviet ones would be additionally reduced by as many.

Along with this an accord must also be reached on reducing to equal levels on both sides the number of medium-range nuclear-delivery aircraft stationed in this region by the U.S.S.R. and the NATO countries.

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INTERIM PROPOSAL, 1983

From the opening of these negotiations nearly 18 months ago, I have repeatedly urged the Soviets to respond to our zero-zero proposal with a proposal of their own. I've also repeated our willingness to consider any serious alternative proposal. Their failure to make such a proposal is a source of deep disappointment to all of us. . . .

But I do not intend to let this shadow that has been cast over the Geneva negotiations further darken our search for peace. When it comes to intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe, it would be better to have none than to have some. But if there must be some, it is better to have few than to have many. If the Soviets will not agree to the total elimination of these weapons, I hope that they will at least join us in an interim agreement that would substantially reduce these forces to equal levels on both sides.

To this end, Ambassador Paul Nitze has informed his Soviet counterpart that we are prepared to negotiate an interim agreement in which the United States would substantially reduce its planned deployment of Pershing 2 and ground-launch cruise missiles provided the Soviet Union reduced the number of its warheads on longer-range I.N.F. missiles to an equal level on a global basis. . . .

Our proposal for the entire elimination of these systems remains on the table. . . .

THE NUCLEAR FREEZE RESOLUTION, H.J. RES. 13

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, consistent with the maintenance of essential equivalence in overall nuclear capabilities, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) between the United States and the Soviet Union should have the following objectives:

(1) Pursuing the objective of negotiating an immediate, mutual and verifiable freeze.

(2) Deciding when and how to achieve a mutual verifiable freeze on testing, production, and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems.

(3) Consistent with pursuing the objective of negotiating an immediate, mutual and verifiable freeze, giving special attention to destabilizing weapons, especially those which give either nation capabilities which confer upon it even the hypothetical advantages of a first strike.

(4) Proceeding from this mutual and verifiable freeze, pursuing substantial, equitable, and verifiable reductions through numerical ceilings, annual percentages, or any other equally effective and verifiable means of strengthening strategic stability.

(5) Preserving present limitations and controls on nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems.

(6) Incorporating ongoing negotiations in Geneva on intermediate-range nuclear systems into the START negotiations.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of March, 1983, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

European Monetary System (EMS)

Mar. 21—Meeting in Brussels, the 8 Common Market countries of the European Monetary System agree to realign their currencies for a 7th time; The Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg and West Germany revalue their currencies upward (with the West German mark rising 5.5 percent); France devalues the franc 2.5 percent; Eire and Italy also devalue their currencies.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)

Mar. 2—World Bank vice president Eugene Rotberg reports that the World Bank made a record \$448-million profit in the 1st half of its 1983 fiscal year.

Iran-Iraq War

Mar. 2—The Iraqi press agency claims that Iraqi naval units destroyed 5 Iranian ships and some offshore oil rigs in the Persian Gulf's northern region today.

Mar. 9—Baghdad radio claims that Iraqi planes have attacked Iranian targets near Missan.

Middle East

(See also *Lebanon; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 18—Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens tells U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger that Israeli forces are under "strict instructions" to avoid incidents with U.S. Marines in the U.N. peacekeeping force in Lebanon.

Mar. 24—The U.S. Embassy in Beirut announces that U.S. Marine and Israeli commands have agreed on "improved measures" to avoid confrontations.

Mar. 26—Lebanon's President Amin Gemayel says that he will not allow Israel to keep patrols in southern Lebanon, because the troops would compromise his nation's sovereignty.

Mar. 30—Speaking in Damascus, Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasir Arafat rejects U.S. President Ronald Reagan's Middle East peace plan.

Nonaligned Conference

Mar. 12—A 5-day conference of leaders from 101 non-aligned countries and organizations concludes in New Delhi; the U.S. is chastised for its Latin American policies; the group calls for disarmament, economic cooperation, and development aid for the poor nations.

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

Mar. 14—OPEC oil ministers conclude a week of negotiations in London, agreeing to reduce their oil prices for the 1st time in 23 years; oil prices are cut 15 percent, from \$34 per barrel to \$29 per barrel for Saudi light crude, with a total OPEC production level set at 17.5 million barrels a day for the rest of 1983; the members agree to limit individual production quotas.

Mar. 30—The British National Oil Company proposes price cuts in North Sea oil of 50 cents to 75 cents per barrel.

ARGENTINA

Mar. 28—Although the government terms it illegal, the General Confederation of Labor holds a 24-hour strike to protest the economic policies of President Reynaldo Bignone; the country is brought to a virtual standstill.

AUSTRALIA

Mar. 6—Results from yesterday's election show that the Labor party has won; party leader Robert Hawke will be the new Prime Minister.

BANGLADESH

Mar. 25—President Hussain Mohammed Ershad lifts a ban on indoor political gatherings; he proposes to hold elections in 1984.

BULGARIA

Mar. 11—Bulgaria signs a \$165-million, three-year trade agreement with Nicaragua; Bulgaria will buy \$38 million in Nicaraguan commodities and will help construct a new port at El Bluff on the Atlantic coast.

CANADA

Mar. 23—At a news conference in Ottawa, U.S. Vice President George Bush says that the U.S. has not asked Canada to allow the U.S. to test cruise missiles over northern Alberta.

CHILE

Mar. 20—The government expels another priest; 3 clergymen have been deported in the last week for running a "politically oriented soup kitchen" for the urban poor.

Mar. 23—The government devalues the peso, doubles tariffs, and raises taxes as part of an emergency economic program.

Mar. 24—Almost 250 people are arrested during demonstrations in Santiago.

CHINA

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Mar. 2—Ye Jian-ying resigns as Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

Mar. 3—Defense Minister Zhang Aiping says China should concentrate its defense funds on "strategic guided missiles and centers for producing nuclear fuels and bombs."

Mar. 6—Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Jia Shi arrives in Moscow for trade talks.

Mar. 29—Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang tells visiting U.S. Congressman Thomas P. O'Neill (D., Mass.) that relations between their 2 countries have not improved since U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz's visit in February.

COSTA RICA

Mar. 3—On a visit to Costa Rica, Pope John Paul II expresses his "profound sadness" at the news of the execution of 6 men in Guatemala after he appealed for clemency.

ECUADOR

Mar. 19—Following measures required by the International Monetary Fund, the government devalues the sucre by 27 percent; prices are raised on milk and fuel oil.

Mar. 23—A nationwide general strike protests the devaluation of the sucre and other austerity measures adopted by the government.

EGYPT

Mar. 4—State-controlled newspapers report that relations with the Soviet Union will be restored soon.

Mar. 5—President Hosni Mubarak says he rejects any "interference in our internal affairs" by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); the PLO recently issued a resolution calling for contacts with "Egypt's nationalist forces."

Mar. 14—Following the removal of 2 Cabinet members by President Mubarak on March 13 for involvement in a corruption scandal, 2 new ministers are named to the ministries of supply and industry.

EL SALVADOR

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 1—Arturo Rivera Damas is named Archbishop of San Salvador; Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero was assassinated in 1980 while celebrating Mass.

Mar. 3—Government sources report that they have decided to hold elections in December rather than March, 1984.

Mar. 6—In San Salvador, Pope John Paul II calls for a "dialogue" among Salvadorans.

Mar. 15—A judge hearing the case involving the 1980 murder of 4 U.S. churchwomen rules that the trial cannot proceed until more evidence is provided by a lower court; 5 former National Guard soldiers have been accused of the murder.

FINLAND

Mar. 22—Preliminary results of elections held on March 20 and 21 leave the Social Democrats the strongest party in Parliament; the Conservative party was expected to make large gains in the election.

FRANCE

Mar. 7—Results from the 1st round of yesterday's national municipal elections show that Conservative and moderate opposition parties gained against the Socialist and Communist parties; 50.1 percent of the vote was cast for opposition party candidates, and in 12 large cities Socialist or Communist party candidates lost.

Mar. 9—The Defense Ministry announces that the army chief of staff is being replaced because of remarks he made in December on the cutbacks the government has imposed on the military.

Mar. 14—With the final round of national municipal elections held yesterday, the Socialist and Communist parties lose a total of 30 mayoralties.

Mar. 22—The Cabinet resigns; President Mitterrand reappoints Pierre Mauroy as Prime Minister. A new

Cabinet is named that turns some Cabinet posts into secretariats and diminishes the number of Cabinet posts held by Communists.

Mar. 24—The reorganization of the Cabinet is completed; there are 14 full Ministers and 27 new sub-ministers and secretaries of state.

Mar. 25—The government announces an austerity program that includes limits on the amount of money that can be taken out of the country, a "forced loan" to the government in the form of a repayable surtax, a ban on the use of credit cards outside France, and new taxes on gasoline, liquor, tobacco and other items.

GERMANY, WEST

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Mar. 6—Elections give Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Christian Democrats 244 seats in the 498-member Parliament, with 48.8 percent of the vote. The Free Democratic party, junior party in the government, wins 34 seats, with 6.9 percent of the vote. The opposition Social Democratic party suffers its worst defeat since 1961, winning only 193 seats, 38.2 percent of the vote. For the 1st time, the Green party enters Parliament, winning 27 seats.

Mar. 13—A member of the Green party resigns his seat in Parliament after it is disclosed that he was a Nazi.

The Christian Democratic party wins a majority of the seats in a state election in northern Germany.

Mar. 21—It is announced that Franz Josef Strauss, leader of the Christian Social Union and part of the Kohl coalition, has rejected Chancellor Kohl's offer to join the coalition Cabinet; he will remain in Munich as Bavarian state premier.

GHANA

Mar. 2—The government announces that it has arrested 9 soldiers and 2 civilians for an attempted coup on February 27.

GREECE

Mar. 3—About 80,000 people demonstrate against U.S. military bases in Greece in a protest organized by the ruling Socialist party and 2 other parties.

Mar. 19—Talks resume on the status of U.S. military bases in Greece.

GUATEMALA

(See also *Costa Rica*)

Mar. 7—Pope John Paul II arrives in Guatemala City; he warns that "God will punish" those who harm the Indians in Guatemala.

Mar. 10—The army announces that government troops killed 4 people in early March, including an employee of the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Mar. 13—President Efraín Ríos Montt announces an amnesty for leftist guerrillas.

Mar. 23—President Ríos Montt officially ends the state of siege he declared in July, 1982; he also announces that he will turn power over to an elected civilian government, but he does not present a timetable for elections.

HONDURAS

(See also *Nicaragua*)

Mar. 8—Pope John Paul II ends his visit to Honduras.

Mar. 25—The Foreign Ministry denies a Nicaraguan government charge that Honduran troops crossed into Nicaragua last week.

INDIA

- Mar. 10—An agreement is signed with Pakistan; a joint commission will be set up to improve economic, industrial and cultural relations.
- Mar. 18—The chief minister of the state of Assam says at least 3,000 people were killed in Assam last month.
- Mar. 26—Maneka Gandhi, the daughter-in-law of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, announces that she has formed an opposition political party that will try to mobilize the country's youth, increase technical training, and set up a "rural land army" to improve agricultural areas.

INDONESIA

- Mar. 10—President Suharto is elected to a 4th 5-year term by the Indonesian Assembly; he is also given the power "to do whatever he deems necessary" for the safety of the country.

IRAN

(See *Intl, Iran-Iraq War*)

IRAQ

(See *Intl, Iran-Iraq War*)

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East; Lebanon; United Kingdom, Great Britain; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Mar. 3—Policemen raid the homes of Jewish settlers on the occupied West Bank looking for illegal arms and other evidence that would link the settlers to recent attacks on Palestinian civilians.
- Mar. 14—Speaking in Amman, Jordan, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter says that Israeli settlements on the West Bank are an obstacle to peace in the area.
- Mar. 21—Israeli radio reports that the government has decided to set up 15 additional military settlements on the West Bank this year and to convert 8 existing military settlements to civilian settlements.
- The Cabinet agrees to allow Israel to share data it has collected from the war in Lebanon with the U.S. military.
- Mar. 22—In a 61-57 vote with 2 blank ballots, Parliament elects the Labor party's Chaim Herzog President.

ITALY

(See also *Lebanon*)

- Mar. 2—In a speech to the Italian Communist party congress, party leader Enrico Berlinguer says his party does not want Italy to leave the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
- Italian news agencies report that the government has formally told 8 people, including 4 Bulgarians, that they are under investigation for possible links to a plot to kill Lech Walesa, the head of the disbanded Solidarity labor union in Poland.

JAPAN

- Mar. 5—Sadanori Yamanaka, Minister of International Trade and Industry, tells a parliamentary budget committee that Japan will not export weapons to the U.S.; this contradicts an earlier statement by Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone.
- Mar. 8—The government announces that the unemployment rate for January was 2.72 percent, the highest rate in 30 years.

JORDAN

- Mar. 18—King Hussein arrives in London for talks with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher; Hussein is part of an Arab League delegation.

KAMPUCHEA

- Mar. 31—The government reports that Vietnamese troops are attacking 3 guerrilla camps along the Thai-Cambodian border; unconfirmed reports say at least 20 people have been killed and 7,000 have fled the camps into Thailand.

KOREA, SOUTH

- Mar. 15—President Chun Doo Hwan commutes the death sentences of 2 men convicted of setting fire to the U.S. cultural center in Pusan in March, 1982; the 2 will serve life sentences.
- Mar. 26—The government announces the arrest of 15 students for participating in unlicensed, anti-government demonstrations during the last week.

LEBANON

(See also *Intl, Middle East; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Mar. 4—According to Foreign Minister Elie Salem, discussing normal relations with Israel would lead to civil war in Lebanon; Lebanon has proposed that talks on future relations between the 2 countries should be postponed for 6 months in order to advance the stalled negotiations on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon.
- Mar. 15—5 U.S. Marines and 9 Italian soldiers are wounded in 2 separate incidents in Beirut; the troops are part of the U.N. international peacekeeping force in Beirut.

LESOTHO

(See *South Africa*)

LIBYA

(See *Sudan*)

MAURITIUS

- Mar. 28—Prime Minister Aneerood Jugnauth forms a new Cabinet; 11 ministers resigned on March 23.

MEXICO

- Mar. 3—In New York, Citibank announces that Mexico has signed a \$5-billion, 6-year loan agreement with 530 banks.

NICARAGUA

(See also *Bulgaria; Honduras*)

- Mar. 4—In his visit to Managua, Pope John Paul II criticizes the "People's Church" and indirectly criticizes 5 priests who hold positions in the government. The Pope's speech is repeatedly interrupted by Sandinistas in the audience.
- Mar. 22—The government claims that at least 2,000 armed insurgents have entered Nicaragua from Honduras.
- Mar. 25—Junta leader Daniel Ortega Saavedra meets with Soviet General Secretary Yuri V. Andropov in Moscow.
- Mar. 26—Sergio Ramirez Mercado, a member of the ruling junta, says that the recent rebel attacks show that the U.S. has decided to overthrow the government of Nicaragua.

PAKISTAN(See also *India*)

Mar. 27—President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq announces the end of the press censorship that went into effect in 1979.

POLAND(See also *Italy*)

Mar. 10—Workers at the Gdansk shipyard send an open letter to Parliament demanding the restoration of the banned trade union Solidarity.

Mar. 11—At a news conference in New York, a former regional chairman of Solidarity accuses the Polish government of setting up secret military penal camps for those found guilty of violating martial law; he says at least 8,000 people have been imprisoned in the camps since last fall.

Mar. 13—About 2,000 people hold an illegal rally in Gdansk; the rally is quickly dissolved by riot police.

SOUTH AFRICA

Mar. 4—3 journalists are found guilty of violating the Official Secrets Act after they report that the South African secret service was involved in the attempted overthrow of the Seychelles government in 1981; South Africa's government denies it was involved.

Mar. 20—The Nerderduitse Gereformeerde Sendingkerk, the largest church for South Africans of mixed race, announces that it will perform interracial marriages and sanction civil disobedience in certain circumstances; the announcement challenges key government racial policies.

Mar. 28—Law and Order Minister Louis Le Grange denies that South African police were involved in an attack on a military barracks in Lesotho last weekend.

Mar. 30—The government announces that the higher tax rate on blacks' income will end March 1, 1984.

Prime Minister P. W. Botha announces that a referendum will be held for white voters on his proposal to allow mixed race and Indian parliamentary participation.

SUDAN

Mar. 13—The official press agency reports that authorities have seized 70 tons of ammunition and arms that Libyan agents smuggled into the country last month to overthrow the government.

SURINAME

Mar. 21—In Geneva, the International Commission of Jurists charges that the human rights situation in Suriname has "deteriorated dramatically" in 2 years.

THAILAND(See also *Kampuchea*)

Mar. 16—The Parliament rejects an amendment to the constitution that would have given the military a permanent role in the Senate.

Mar. 19—Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda dissolves the Parliament and calls for general elections within 1 month. Elections were to have been held in June, based on a new election system that would have strengthened the party system.

Mar. 26—*The Economist* (London) reports that army commander in chief General Arthit Kamlangek ordered the Prime Minister to dissolve Parliament after the Parliament's March 16 action.

U.S.S.R.(See also *China; Egypt; Nicaragua; U.S., Foreign Policy, Military*)

Mar. 1—Talks with China resume in Moscow between the deputy foreign ministers of each country.

Mar. 7—A series of news commentaries is released, warning West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl that his government did not receive a mandate to deploy U.S. nuclear missiles in Germany in yesterday's elections.

Mar. 9—The government press agency Tass says that U.S. President Ronald Reagan has a "pathological hatred of Socialism and Communism"; the remarks follow a March 8 speech by President Reagan.

Mar. 10—The government orders the expulsion of an American diplomat for possessing a portable electronic transmitter and a notepad with notes written on paper soluble in water.

The first secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Yevgeny Kochetkov, says that the Soviet Union may be willing to consider on-site inspection to verify arms control agreements under certain conditions.

Mar. 17—Government officials say that a "substantial détente" has been reached with China.

Mar. 20—The government reports that Afghan guerrillas are using chemical grenades supplied by the U.S.

Mar. 24—Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko is named First Deputy Prime Minister.

Mar. 26—General Secretary Yuri V. Andropov says that President Reagan's call for an American antiballistic missile program is an attempt "to disarm the Soviet Union."

UNITED KINGDOM**Great Britain**(See also *Intl, OPEC; Jordan; Zimbabwe*)

Mar. 5—3 members of a group not affiliated with the PLO are convicted of attempting to murder Shlomo Argov, Israel's Ambassador to Britain, in June, 1982; the incident led to Israel's invasion of Lebanon.

Mar. 24—In a comeback for the party, the Labor party candidate retains his seat in a by-election in the city of Darlington.

Mar. 31—3 Soviet diplomats are ordered expelled for "unacceptable activities."

UNITED STATES**Administration**(See also *Political Scandal*)

Mar. 2—In Washington, D.C., U.S. district court Judge Thomas Flannery issues a permanent injunction that bars the Department of Health and Human Services from notifying parents if federally supported family-planning clinics provide prescription contraceptives to teenagers.

Mar. 3—It is reported that Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator Anne McGill (Gorsuch) Buford has advised President Ronald Reagan to open up all disputed agency files to congressional investigating committees.

Mar. 8—White House spokesman Larry Speakes says that the administration will try to sell the country's 4 weather satellites and 1 survey satellite to private industry.

Mar. 9—Margaret M. Heckler is sworn in as Secretary of Health and Human Services. She was confirmed by the Senate on March 3.

Anne Buford resigns as EPA administrator; President Reagan accepts the resignation with "deep regret."

EPA deputy director John Hernandez Jr. is named acting director; President Reagan says that all the documents Congress asked for will be turned over to the investigating committee of the House.

Mar. 10—The Federal Regulatory Commission votes to permit utilities to charge wholesale customers for the costs of new plants before the plants go into service.

Mar. 11—President Reagan issues a directive that will place additional curbs on the handling and dissemination of classified information, and will require many more federal employees to sign secrecy agreements; the directive will apparently also affect current and past employees who signed such agreements.

Mar. 21—President Reagan selects the 1st EPA administrator, William D. Ruckelshaus, to head the agency again.

Mar. 22—The Department of Agriculture announces that farmers have agreed to reduce the amount of acreage they will plant in grain and cotton this year by 82.3 million acres, a 36 percent reduction over 1982.

Mar. 25—The White House announces the resignation of 5 senior officials of the EPA, including acting director John Hernandez Jr.

In a report released today, the FBI says that the Soviet Union does not "directly control or manipulate" the U.S. nuclear freeze movement.

Mar. 26—6 former Cabinet officers from both political parties call for a \$25-billion cut in 1985 military expenditures and the reduction of the projected budget deficit for fiscal year 1985 to \$75 billion from \$175 billion.

Mar. 29—The Department of Health and Human Services says that the administration is now interpreting Medicaid regulations so that states may "require adult family members to support adult relatives [in nursing homes] without violating the Medicaid statute."

Economy

Mar. 2—The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators rose 3.6 percent in January.

Mar. 4—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate remained unchanged at 10.2 percent in February.

Mar. 21—The Commerce Department estimates that the nation's gross national product (GNP) grew at a 4 percent annual rate in the 1st quarter of 1983.

Mar. 23—The Labor Department reports a 0.2 percent decline in the consumer price index in February.

Mar. 24—The New York Stock Exchange's Dow Jones industrial average reaches a new high of 1,145.90.

Mar. 29—The Commerce Department reports that the U.S. balance of trade deficit was \$3.58 billion in February.

Mar. 30—The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators rose 1.4 percent in February.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Middle East, Nonaligned Conference; Canada; China; El Salvador; Greece; Israel; Japan; Lebanon; Nicaragua; U.S.S.R.*)

Mar. 2—The New York Times reports that Central Intelligence Agency specialists say the growth rate of mil-

itary spending in the U.S.S.R. has been overstated; in the last 6 years the rate is closer to 2 percent than 3 or 4 percent.

Mar. 4—President Ronald Reagan says he may increase the number of U.S. military advisers in El Salvador; there are now 55 U.S. military training advisers there.

Mar. 8—In a speech in Orlando, Florida, to a convention of evangelical Christians, President Reagan warns of the "aggressive impulses of an evil empire" and declares that the Soviet Union is "the focus of evil in the modern world." He also denounces the nuclear freeze movement.

Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger tells congressional leaders that the administration is considering an emergency military aid package of \$110 million for El Salvador, instead of the \$60 million in aid projected earlier.

Mar. 10—The President proclaims exclusive U.S. economic rights over all resources in a 200-mile coastal zone.

The President suggests that the U.S. grant \$298 million in military and economic aid to Central America, including \$110 million in military aid for El Salvador.

Mar. 12—In Washington, D.C., Secretary of State George Shultz meets with Lebanon's Foreign Minister Elie Salem to try to break the impasse over the removal of foreign troops from Lebanon.

Mar. 13—Weinberger charges that the Soviet Union is trying to force the U.S. to retreat to a "fortress America" by stimulating chaos in Central America.

In Washington, D.C., Shultz confers with Israel's Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir.

Mar. 14—President Reagan tells Shamir about the "necessity and urgency" of Israeli agreement on the terms for withdrawing its troops from Lebanon.

Mar. 18—A State Department official says that the infiltration of arms into El Salvador "is considerably above anything we've seen before."

Mar. 22—In Washington, D.C., Shultz says Salvadorans have been told to "clean up" their record on human rights or forfeit American support.

Mar. 23—President Reagan proposes that American scientists develop an effective antiballistic missile (ABM) defense to counter the Soviet threat. He appeals for strong public support for his proposed military budget now pending in Congress.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee makes public memorandums exchanged between Kenneth Adelman, the President's candidate for head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and others about proposed personnel changes at the agency. In testimony to the committee, Adelman has denied thinking about personnel at all.

Mar. 24—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee tells the administration that the President's request for more military aid to El Salvador should be cut from \$60 million to \$30 million.

Mar. 25—The President says his projected development of an antimissile defense system will avoid war.

Mar. 26—It is reported in Washington that the U.S. has notified the U.S.S.R. that the new antiballistic missile research proposed by President Reagan will not violate the ABM treaty.

Mar. 27—The State Department declares that Soviet General Secretary Yuri Andropov made "false allegations" when he said the U.S. is seeking military domination over the Soviet Union.

Mar. 29—At a White House news conference, President Ronald Reagan says he sees a possible future in which the U.S. would share with the Soviet Union a comprehensive type of missile defense if it is successfully developed and put into operation; this would encourage the elimination of all offensive nuclear weapons.

Mar. 30—In a televised speech, President Reagan proposes an "interim agreement" under which the U.S. will reduce its planned deployment of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles if "the Soviet Union reduces the number of its warheads on longer-range INF missiles to an equal level on a global basis."

Mar. 31—President Reagan says the U.S. cannot legally release some 75 F-16 fighters for shipment to Israel until Israel withdraws its forces from Lebanon.

President Reagan again calls the U.S. nuclear freeze movement a danger to nuclear arms reduction negotiations.

Labor and Industry

Mar. 1—Voting 169 to 63, the presidents of the United Steelworkers union locals ratify a new 41-month contract with U.S. steel companies that grants many concessions, including wage concessions, on a national level.

Mar. 31—International Brotherhood of Teamsters president Roy Williams is sentenced in U.S. district court in Chicago to a 55-year prison term and \$29,000 in fines.

Legislation

Mar. 17—After a 13-hour session, the House Democratic leaders postpone the vote on the nuclear freeze resolution until after the Easter recess.

Mar. 23—The House votes 229 to 196 to approve a federal budget drafted by the Democratic party, providing a 4 percent real increase in defense spending, in effect rejecting the President's budget, which calls for a 10 percent real increase in defense spending.

Mar. 24—The House gives final congressional approval to a \$4.6-billion emergency jobs bill.

The President signs the jobs bill.

Mar. 25—Voting 243 to 102, the House gives final approval to new Social Security legislation providing for a temporary freeze on benefits, the gradual raising of the retirement age to 67, the gradual imposition of additional payroll taxes, the inclusion in the Social Security system of federal workers hired after January 1, 1984, and other changes, to ensure the system's continuing solvency.

Military

Mar. 9—At a news conference, Secretary of Defense Weinberger says, "I think we have begun to catch up" to the steady expansion of Soviet military power. The Defense Department releases a new 107-page booklet, *Soviet Military Power*, that tells of Soviet military advances in the last 18 months.

Political Scandal

(See also *Administration*)

Mar. 7—Testifying before the House Energy and Commerce Committee's investigation subcommittee, the Environmental Protection Agency's general counsel agrees that he should not have taken part in a settlement to clean up a toxic waste dump because his former employer was involved in the settlement.

Mar. 9—Despite the resignation of Anne Buford as ad-

ministrator of the EPA, committee chairmen of congressional investigating groups continue to investigate possible political manipulation in toxic waste cleanup funds, possible conflicts of interest, perjury, and EPA favoritism toward industry.

Mar. 15—Representative James Scheuer (D., N.Y.) charges that acting EPA administrator John Hernandez Jr. intervened to allow the Dow Chemical Company to alter an EPA draft report.

Mar. 19—Rita Lavelle, former head of the EPA's toxic waste disposal programs, says she will not appear on March 21 to respond to a subpoena from the House Energy and Commerce Committee's investigations subcommittee.

Supreme Court

Mar. 2—The Court unanimously rules that police do not need a search warrant to follow a moving object by monitoring the signal from an implanted radio transmitter.

The Court rules 5 to 4 that an act of Congress prohibiting state and local governments from discriminating against their employees on the basis of age is constitutional.

Mar. 7—In a unanimous decision, the Court rules that if government employees are negligent in carrying out a required inspection with adequate care, the federal government can be sued for negligence.

The Court refuses to involve itself in a conflict over insurance liability for diseases caused by asbestos; it lets stand a federal appeals court ruling that a manufacturer is covered for asbestos-related diseases by the insurance policy in force when the disease becomes "manifest."

Mar. 22—The Court rules unanimously that generic drugs may not be sold without the approval of the Food and Drug Administration.

VATICAN

(See also *Costa Rica; El Salvador; Guatemala; Honduras; Nicaragua*)

Mar. 11—Pope John Paul II returns after his 8-day visit to Central America.

VIETNAM

(See *Kampuchea*)

YUGOSLAVIA

Mar. 25—A spokesman for a committee representing a group of international banks says that an agreement has been reached with the government on a \$2-billion loan package.

ZIMBABWE

Mar. 5—Government troops stage a raid on the area where opposition leader Joshua Nkomo is under house arrest; 1 man is reported killed.


Mar. 8—Nkomo flees to Botswana.

Mar. 13—Nkomo arrives in London.

Mar. 26—Prime Minister Robert Mugabe addresses a rally of 30,000 in Harare, saying the men loyal to Nkomo "commit robberies, rapes, kidnappings and assassinations."

Mar. 29—The Roman Catholic bishops report that the recent government campaign against dissidents has "brought about the maiming and death of hundreds and hundreds of innocent people who are neither dissidents nor collaborators." ■

Nuclear lineup



JF

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